BUSINESS AS USUAL:

An Imperial President?: US Presidents and the Making of Foreign Policy (Tim Clancey, History Today)

The Constitution was explicit on presidential control over foreign policy. The President would be Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, would negotiate treaties, nominate ambassadors and foreign policy advisers, and receive envoys from foreign governments. Congress, though, could confirm or reject presidential nominees, would have control over raising and financially supporting armies, and – very important to the Constitution’s Founding Fathers – only with Congress’s support could a treaty be ratified or a war declared. The Constitution has hardly changed since then, and a key story of US government since has been a struggle between the Presidency and Congress for control. John F. Kennedy admitted in 1963 ‘When you’re in the White House, Congress looks like the enemy.’

In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that ‘the President of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives which he has no opportunity of exercising … the laws permit him to be strong, circumstances keep him weak.’ The first half of the 20th century, however, provided increasing opportunities as the USA began to operate as a genuine world power. Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency took US involvement in world affairs further than ever before. Roosevelt’s political energy and ambitions for the presidency – Graubard’s view is that ‘an elemental force had entered the White House’ – was at times frustrated in domestic policy by a strong Senate, but his expertise and leadership in foreign policy set the tone for much of the 20th century. Not all of his successors took the same interest in foreign policy, but the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were definitely shapers of their country’s foreign policy to the extent that they were at least temporarily able to take the initiative away from Congress.

Wilson did not match Theodore Roosevelt’s expertise in foreign policy but he did match his ambition. In Wilson’s view, the president was ‘at liberty both in law and conscience to be as big a man as he can’. Once Congress had authorised the USA’s entry into World War I in 1917 Wilson found himself in a position to mobilise the nation. This made the presidency more powerful than ever before. Yet within three years Wilson was humiliated by the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and join Wilson’s own brainchild, the League of Nations. Even more significant was the growth of ‘isolationism’ that followed. Franklin Roosevelt took an internationalist view of foreign policy in the tradition of Wilson, but Congress’s response to the rise of the dictators in the 1930s was to pass a series of neutrality acts, resolutions and amendments designed to preserve US isolation, and this stance was firmly backed by public opinion. Roosevelt was buoyed by an unprecedented third election victory in 1940 but had to tell Churchill as late as autumn 1941 that Congress would not sanction a declaration of war.

When the USA entered World War II in 1941 there was no long-term tradition of presidential domination of foreign policy. However, the post-1941 period saw successive presidents able to exercise greater control. There was no dispute that the USA was right to enter the war after the unprovoked Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour, and this was a turning point in the role of the president in foreign policy. Roosevelt proved to be a towering war leader, already admired for his presidential record before the war and then pursuing Germany and Japan to unconditional surrender. Congress chose not to object to his arbitrary approach to foreign policy decision-making. Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945, stated that foreign policy was ‘the prerogative of the Chief Executive’, in other words the President; such a statement in the 1930s would have been unthinkable.

Once Congress had come to terms with the reality of a ‘Cold War’ by the late 1940s, Harry Truman and his successors enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress for any strong stance taken by the USA in foreign affairs. Congress might complain, criticise or water down presidential initiatives – the Marshall Plan (a programme of economic aid to Europe) was scaled down to a fraction of its original scope – but outright defiance of Truman’s foreign policy wishes hardly occurred. Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson enjoyed a similar level of bipartisan support. Kennedy blockaded Cuba and placed the US air force on alert in 1962 without consulting, or receiving any objection from, Congress; and, astonishingly, the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution – allowing Johnson freedom to commit as many US troops as he wished in Vietnam (in response to a North Vietnam attack on a US destroyer in the said gulf) – was passed unanimously in the House of Representatives, and with only two votes against in the Senate. When Professor Clinton Rossiter wrote in 1965 that the presidency combined ‘the dignity of a king and the authority of a prime minister in one elective office’, and that ‘one of the true prides of the American people is that none of their presidents has been a scoundrel or a tyrant’, his views would have been far more widely accepted than would be the case today.

The key to understanding the growth of presidential dominance of foreign policy after 1941 lies not just in the consensus over foreign policy but also in the tactics used by presidents to manage Congress. A president would usually consult with congressional leaders beforehand to explain and persuade them not to oppose his plans. Truman and Eisenhower both used this tactic to remarkable effect. Eisenhower was able, in 1955 and 1957, to win the go-ahead to take whatever military action he saw fit in defence of Taiwan and US interests in the Middle East.

Truman, struggling to rouse a Congress unconvinced of cold war and worried by domestic economic problems, repeatedly used dramatic scare tactics to push his policies through Congress. The Truman Doctrine (a mission statement to prevent the spread of communism by whatever means necessary) went through after Truman used apocalyptic anti-communist rhetoric. For the Marshall Plan, Truman made a personal appearance before the House of Representatives, warning that the plan was not enough on its own and more must be done. Truman was able to use external events to persuade Congress; for example the announcement that the USSR had exploded its first atom bomb in 1949 did wonders to persuade Congress to allocate funds to NATO. He could also use the recognised need to act quickly in foreign policy when intervening in Korea in 1950, advising opposition leader Senator Taft that Congress would not be consulted, and then, although publicising Taft’s support for the intervention, ignoring the senator’s objection to the lack of consultation.

Later, Johnson and Nixon and Reagan were all prepared to effectively lie to Congress, or at least deliberately conceal information, in order to have their way in foreign policy.

In other words, if you don't need them to pass a treaty or legislation, you've always been pretty much free to ignore Congress in the arena of foreign policy.

Posted by Orrin Judd at March 2, 2006 9:33 AM