ADVANCE TO THE REAR

What to do about Iraq (Barry Rubin, Jerusalem Post, November 29th, 2005)

One assumption which must be questioned is the idea that because the American troops cannot put down the insurgency, the Iraqi forces are far weaker and certainly are incapable of defending themselves. Obviously, this idea is based on the current state of Iraq's army, though after all much of the fault is due to the US decision to dissolve the existing armed forces and not to the Iraqis themselves.

But it is also largely derived from past American experience with different kinds of situations usually outside the Middle East. The common pattern was that the United States was supporting a regime which was not popular, or at least could not mobilize many people, fighting a communist insurgency which could fight anywhere in the country. The government simply could not exist without US support.

This is not the case in Iraq, where the government will enjoy overwhelmingly popular support and be able to mobilize large numbers of armed men. In addition to the Kurdish militias there are also a lot of guns among the Shi'ite. Having so long been the victims of terrorism, these communities are highly motivated to fight the insurgents. Indeed, if anything the presence of US forces have held them back.

After an American withdrawal, the pro-regime forces are going to flatten the insurgents. They will not be gentle about it and the American military is not going to want to be there to take the blame for the human rights abuses that will no doubt occur. On a secondary level, an American departure is going to undermine the claims of the insurgents and reduce anger at the United States among Shi'ite elements. It will also give the ruling Shia-Kurdish coalition a bigger incentive to try to reconcile those Sunnis willing to make a reasonable deal.

It is a testament to the utter moral and political confusion that attends the Iraq debate that the United States may have to withdraw from Iraq in order to prove that it won.