GOOD ENOUGH FOR TURKEY:

A lively contest—but will it matter?: Mostafa Moin, a leading reformist, is putting up a strong challenge to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservative front-runner in Iran’s presidential election. But whoever wins, it is unclear if Friday’s vote will change the way the Islamic Republic is run (The Economist, June 16th 2005)

Iran today is indeed a less stiflingly repressive place than it was in the early years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in which a pro-western monarchy was swept away by puritanical Shia Muslim clerics who despised America—“the Great Satan”. Young Iranians have rather more freedom in how they dress in public, in their contact with the opposite sex and in the music they enjoy.

However, it has seemed increasingly clear during the two terms in office of the current, moderately reformist president, Muhammad Khatami, that for all the outward signs of democracy, ultimate power continues to rest with the mullahs—in particular the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Time and again, President Khatami saw his liberalising laws passed by the elected parliament, only for them to be overruled by the unelected Council of Guardians, a hardline group of clerics and Islamic jurists.

So it is unclear how much will really change, whoever wins the presidency this time. [...]

As for the religious hardliners, they may now be regretting not uniting around one candidate, since none of the three remaining hardliners in the race has done well. The worst case for them would be a run-off between the liberal Mr Moin and the independent-minded Mr Rafsanjani, the candidate most able to challenge the ayatollahs. Some suspect that bombs in Tehran and elsewhere in the final days of the campaign, which killed several people, were the work of conservatives trying to scare voters from the polls; but the various attacks may in fact have unrelated causes.

In a country whose minimum voting age is 15 and where half of the 67m population is under 25, the main candidates have been keen to demonstrate that they understand young Iranians’ frustration at their lack of personal freedoms and gloomy job prospects. [...]

With growth faltering, unemployment officially at 11% (the true figure may be almost twice as high) and inflation at 14%, the economy is the issue that most concerns Iranians. Since the Islamic Revolution, statist Iran has been greatly overtaken by liberalising Turkey, its big rival to the north-west. Freeing Iranians’ entrepreneurial spirit and making it easier for foreign firms to invest in the country’s colossal oil reserves would do more to improve the lot of its citizens than building nuclear bombs. Mr Rafsanjani and Mr Ghalibaf have talked of privatising inefficient state firms but, once again, whoever wins the presidency would face fierce resistance from the clergy.

Some Iranians see signs of an unstoppable popular desire for liberty, and dream of a Ukrainian-style revolution to free their country from the mullahs’ grip. The more pessimistic fear a drift towards becoming the next North Korea—a regime that brandishes nuclear weapons at the outside world while its people slide into penury. For all the recent signs of liberalisation, the clerical regime is determined to hang on and can still crush its opponents with impunity.

The impunity has become doubtful.

MORE:
A Not So Totalitarian Iran (Christopher de Bellaigue, June 15, 2005, LA Times)

[I]t is heartening that the lexicon of reform has been adopted by many of the candidates, including one heavily tipped conservative, Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, and a prominent centrist, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Neither is a democrat by conviction, but both know which way the wind is blowing.

Clearly, Iran is no totalitarian regime, but what is it? Is it an "emerging democracy," as European officials liked to say during Khatami's hopeful early years, before his reform program was derailed by the conservative establishment? I would hesitate before attaching such a label to a regime whose longevity, now that Iranians' adherence to the official ideology has waned, depends on its ability to read and manipulate the public mood.

This ability was in evidence after Iran's soccer triumph against Bahrain on June 8, securing Iran's place in the 2006 World Cup finals. Reluctant to sour the preelection public mood, the authorities did not intervene to stop riotous celebrations that followed the match. Young men and women thronged the streets, dancing to Western music, with some young women throwing off the mandatory head covering.

A few days earlier, in another gesture to public opinion, the hard-line judiciary released Iran's most outspoken political prisoner, Akbar Ganji, ostensibly for medical treatment. But these are merely gestures. After the elections, official attitudes will again harden. There may be reports of a "crackdown" on un-Islamic dress. Ganji is already back in jail.

Nevertheless, the scenes of joy will not be easily forgotten. Ganji's call for Khamenei to present himself for election cannot be unsaid. Whoever wins, Iran will continue to evolve.

Posted by Orrin Judd at June 17, 2005 11:13 AM