ARE THERE NO JEFFERSON SMITH'S IN EUROPE?:

Europe: the Wrong Nation? (Joshua Livestro, 11/15/04, Tech Central Station)

All this ridiculous postulating about the supposed stupidity of the American voter is basically an attempt by Europe's progressivist elite to convince itself that "it could never happen over here." Oddly enough, that also seems to be the conclusion of the much more rigorous analysis of last week's results by the Economist journalists Adrian Wooldridge and John Micklethwait. In an echo of the arguments put forward in their book The Right Nation, they present Bush's victory as a logical consequence of the long conservative march through the institutions. Voters prefer Republican candidates over Democrats because they are convinced Republicans now best embody the typically American values of self-reliance, love of God, family and country, and liberty under the law.

Unlike most of their European colleagues, Wooldridge and Micklethwait are quite willing to accept a vote for Bush as a rational choice. But - and unfortunately there is a but - it seems they only regard this choice as rational in an American context. Hence the subtitle of their book: "Why America is different." In other words: they too accept the European mantra that "it could never happen over here."

This emphasis on American exceptionalism could be interpreted in two different ways. It could, of course, be that the authors are simply restating the old European position in a more sophisticated way. There is certainly evidence in the book of a misguided sense of European moral superiority, at least towards some Americans. For example, the authors make little effort to disguise their contempt for America's Christian communities, whom they routinely refer to as "absolutists" (read: fundamentalists). This contempt for the Christian right seems to have inspired one of the few truly bizarre passages in the book. In it, they accuse Evangelicals of trying to push American foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction on the basis of an "Evangelical belief that the Second Coming will take place in Israel - and that it will be preceded by the conversion of the Jews to Christianity." This sort of conspiracy theory is worthy of Karel de Gucht, not of serious journalists writing for one of the world's most respected news outlets.

The second interpretation argues the exact opposite of the first one. In this version, the fact that "it could never happen over here" is actually really a bad thing. After all, if America is the "Right Nation," where does that leave Europe? The Wrong Nation, with the wrong ideas and the wrong policies, doomed for ever to wander the road to serfdom? It is the flip-side of the moral superiority argument. European intellectuals like to wallow in a sense of tragic destiny. They think of themselves as the Greeks to the new Romans in America: a powerless wise counselor to the all-powerful but ignorant new emperor. Unable to believe in anything else, they have embraced imperfection and relativism as their new Godheads. A complicated solution that offers a half-answer is much preferred by them to a simple answer that actually solves the problem. Their dislike of Christianity is, at its core, a rejection of the Christian message of hope. They are Schopenhauer's spiritual grandchildren, convinced that there is no hope, not for themselves, nor for their fellow men, nor even for their countries. The best we can do is muddle through.

There is no reason for right-thinking Europeans to embrace this nihilistic view of life. Europeans aren't Aristotle's natural slaves. Just like their American cousins, they are capable of dreaming great dreams, fuelled by a passion for liberty. They have always been full of entrepreneurial zest and a spirit of adventure. There is no reason to assume that, once unleashed, their energy and creativity couldn't help to fuel another European economic and cultural Renaissance.

The main difference between Europe and America is that Europeans are still forced to put up with a political class that refuses to face the political and social facts. Europe isn't the wrong nation; it just doesn't have the right kind of politicians - yet.

Even if the remoralization of Europe is a lost cause, it's the only cause there worth fighting for. Here's a guy who knew you could yoke the political power of the masses to conservative aspirations, The life and legacy of Benjamin Disraeli, statesman, novelist and man-about-town, on the bicentenary of his birth. (T.A. Jenkins, December 2004, History Today)

The 1867 session of Parliament became celebrated for Disraeli’s brilliant display of tactical skill, in steering the Reform Bill through the Commons, despite the fact that the government was in a minority. It was essential to prevent the Liberals from uniting behind Gladstone’s leadership, and Disraeli was therefore prepared to make concessions on various points, stripping away many of the restrictions in the original bill, in order to secure support from the Radical section of the opposition. This also gave him the personal satisfaction of leaving Gladstone in a beleaguered position. Consequently, the Reform Bill in its final version almost doubled the electorate of England and Wales, to nearly two million, and gave voting rights to many working men.

Although the main reason for carrying the Bill was to give the Conservatives some much-needed credibility, as a constructive party of government, Disraeli used a public speech at Edinburgh, in October 1867, to claim that it had actually been a preconceived plan and was in keeping with the party’s eighteenth-century Tory traditions. It proved that the Conservatives were really ‘the national party of England’, who trusted in the loyalty and political responsibility of the working classes.

Disraeli succeeded the ailing Derby as prime minister in February 1868, but the Conservatives received little reward from the new electorate and suffered a heavy defeat at the general election later that year. The Liberals, now united under Gladstone, returned to power, and his government embarked on a series of ambitious reforms affecting elementary education, the army, public house licensing, the Irish church and Irish land tenure.

For some time Disraeli was obliged to lie low, but by 1872 there were unmistakable signs that the pressures of relentless reforming activity were opening-up fissures within the Liberal ranks. Whereas some feared that Gladstone was going too far too fast, others were disappointed with the legislation on offer. Among the most extreme elements, there were voices criticising the monarchy and the House of Lords, advocating the disestablishment of the Church of England, and demanding that public houses be shut down to promote temperance.

In two notable public speeches, at Manchester in April and the Crystal Palace in June 1872, Disraeli completed the task of re-working his earlier ideas to fit into a changing political context. He condemned what he called the ‘cosmopolitan’, un-English doctrines of the Liberals, and remarked that Gladstone’s was the first government to have been ‘avowedly formed on a principle of violence’ towards national institutions. There was a remarkable similarity, here, between Disraeli’s strictures against the destructive tendencies of Gladstonian Liberalism and his comments about the Whigs in the 1830s. He also accused Gladstone of weakness in the conduct of foreign policy, by failing to uphold the national interest in disputes with Russia and the USA, and alleged that there was a sinister Liberal plan to bring about the disintegration of the Empire.

Disraeli repeated the assertion he had made in 1867, that there was a natural affinity between the Conservatives and the people because they shared the same ‘national principles’. The ‘working classes’, in particular, were ‘English to the core’ and proud of their country, and they knew that ‘the greatness and the Empire of England are to be attributed to the ancient institutions of the land’. In contrast to the Liberals’ obsession with attacking these institutions, the Conservatives, according to Disraeli, were interested in carrying social reforms to promote the welfare of the people. He did not specify a programme of measures, but hinted at action in such areas as factory hours and public health. The vision of Young England, it seemed, had not entirely dimmed. Indeed, generations of Conservatives to come would believe that Disraeli had established an enduring platform for his party, based on policies of imperialism and social reform.

At the general election of 1874 the Conservatives finally broke the Liberals’ virtual monopoly of government, by recording their first overall majority since Peel’s victory in 1841. The party had significantly expanded its support beyond the traditional county strongholds, to include many seats in urban areas, particularly in London and Lancashire. Contemporary observers were agreed that there had been a marked drift of business and suburban middle-class opinion away from the Liberals, as a result of the unease about Gladstone’s style of government, which Disraeli had so astutely exploited. Nevertheless, Conservative gains in the boroughs would have been impossible without an appreciable degree of working-class support as well.

Disraeli’s social prejudices were apparent in the composition of his government, which was recruited overwhelmingly from members of the ‘natural’ ruling class. Of the twelve original Cabinet ministers, half were peers, one was the son of a Duke, four others (including Disraeli) were landowners and only one, the Home Secretary R.A. Cross, came from a ‘middle class’, banking background. Disraeli himself took a peerage in 1876, becoming the Earl of Beaconsfield, as his fragile health was no longer equal to the demands of leading the House of Commons.

The government had no blueprint for social reform and Disraeli, who never cared for the dry detail of administration, left the initiative to other ministers such as Cross. Several useful, and relatively uncontroversial measures were carried, including the Factory Act (1874), which set a maximum fifty-six hour working week for women and children, and the Artisans Dwellings Act (1875), which gave local authorities powers to carry out slum clearance projects. Disraeli attached special importance to the trade union legislation of 1875, which removed the threat of criminal prosecution of strikers and allowed peaceful picketing.

Foreign and imperial affairs were always of greater interest to Disraeli, and it was in this sphere that he made his personal mark, seeking, sometimes through symbolic gestures, to maintain national power and prestige. In 1875, for example, he received plaudits for his secret negotiation to purchase a 44 per cent stake in the Suez Canal Company, thereby registering the country’s interest in this strategically and economically important waterway. The following year, at Queen Victoria’s request, the Imperial Titles Act elevated her status to that of Empress of India, a move that Disraeli hoped would inspire the imagination and loyalty of the Indians as well as of the electorate at home. He remained convinced of the political value of the monarchy’s emotional appeal to the people, and was eager to appropriate it for the Conservative Party.

Disraeli’s handling of the ‘Eastern Question’ (the position of the Turkish Empire in Eastern Europe), in 1876-78, provoked strong passions on both sides of the political debate. Determined to prevent any extension of Russian influence towards the eastern Mediterranean, which he feared might eventually threaten the trade route to India, Disraeli refused to co-operate with international efforts to coerce the Turks, who had brutally suppressed an uprising by Bulgarian Christians. Furthermore, when Russia declared war on the Turks, Disraeli took preparatory steps to threaten the Russians with the possibility of military intervention. Public opinion was sharply divided, with some joining Gladstone in condemning the government’s ‘immoral’, warmongering behaviour, while others expressed violently anti-Russian sentiments, giving rise to the term ‘jingoism’. Disraeli’s bluff appeared to pay off when he attended a Congress of the European Powers at Berlin, which settled the Eastern crisis and enabled him to return claiming ‘peace with honour’.

Posted by Orrin Judd at November 20, 2004 3:48 PM