Agree with your comments on the timing. I didn't like the original decision but it turned out to be correct in my opinion. Let the terrorists etc. coalesce into a critical mass and the with the Iraqi's blessings, we have them evacuate and caretake willing civilians as we go in to make fullscale war with artillery, gunships, airstrikes, tanks and Marines on the ground shouting remember 9/11. All this at Fallujah while the Army moves down from the North to form an anvil. Special forces can take care of the breakouts toward the west hoping to escape to Syria. The Iraqis can handle all prisoners as they deem necessary.

What does the Times suggest as a plan? @*#$$@&@& leftwing armchair quarterbacks.

One thing that doesn't get mentioned is that Falluja has always been an anomaly. It apparently grew up after WWII as a smuggling center, and became the sort of place that Al Capone might have built, if he hadn't had Chicago. Even Saddam didn't have a firm grip there.

Failure in Falluja shouldn't be considered indicative of anything.

More nausiating than the anti-war actics of the left has been the furious backpedaling by the right on the war, NRO being a prime example. You expect the leftists to cry Vietnam at every opporutnity but to watch NRO, the Weekly Standard etc do it is depressing.

War is many times a situation where, like the song says, "you don't always get what you want, but you get what you need."

We'd like to grind down the jihadis and Ba'athists in Fallujah, rub them out, and hold up their severed heads to the rest of the population: "see? SEE? Don't mess with us!"

Unfortunately, while we COULD have done that, it would have been the wrong thing to do then.

Sadr was the bigger problem, and the risk of turning the Shi'a against us was real. We handled that well by carefully, methodically grinding down Sadr's brigade over several weeks. In the end they quit, and shortly after that Sadr did too. But in doing that, we couldn't turn around and pound down Fallujah. That would have risked a larger uprising which was counter to what we were doing in Najaf.

And we needed the example of the Fallujah Brigade to show Sistani, et al. -- "see? We can work with some Sunnis when we want. How'd you like to see a Sunni-led army, eh?" That was coincident with the time that Sistani realized upon which side his bread was buttered.

Others have noted that Fallujah is a tough nut, and it is. What the Marines have done there since pulling back (a little) has been a near-sublime strategy: they've said to the Fallujahans, okay, you don't want us around, welcome to your alternative. Now they have foreign jihadis running the place, and news is, the locals aren't happy. Just as in Najaf, the locals can compare the careful application of American power with the insufferable arrogance of the jihadis. The Fallujahans need more impressing, and they're currently getting it. Life isn't happy there right now, and the Fallujahans are going to figure out that being ordered around by a bunch of foreign religious zealots isn't what they bargained for.

I would predict that the interim government will at some point deal with Fallujah, that point being when the locals signal that they're really, really tired of the jihadis. The government will assist them in that assessment by reminding them that if the town isn't pacified, it won't participate in the elections in January. We'll help in the background but let the new Iraqi army handle it. Allawi will get the obligatory feather in his hat and will win a full term as PM.

I don't know about returning fire, but didn't we bomb two safehouses in Fallujah last week?

Mike:

There you go, bringing up facts again.

Not allowing men to return fire is almost certainly bad policy.

One thing I find bothersome is that reservists and national guardsmen are in Iraq, while regular army units sit in Korea and Germany. The same thing happened in Vietnam too.

The annoying thing is that this whole thing has been chained to the 24hr news cycle and a Nov. 2 deadline. Folks. Falluja ain't going anywhere. When we and our Iraqi friends are good and ready, and not a moment sooner, we will do what has to be done. I assume that it will be a lot better if Allawi makes the decision with the advice and consent of his goventment than if a US offfice makes it, and if he announces it to the locals.

So, Orrin would have had us withdraw immediately after the overthrow and let the Iraqis handle themselves by themselves.

And on what grounds would we have then expected that the whole country would not have ended up like Fallujah?

Not withdraw. Serve the legitimate Iraqi government.

Which one?

Whichever one we handed sovereignty to would have sufficed, probably Chalabi at that point.