July 25, 2004
GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD:
A failure of imagination (Marc Erikson, 7/24/04, Asia Times)
The 9-11 Commission's report, made public this Thursday after being in the works for 20 months, had 46 more pages than the Senate's, but proves no more illuminating. The bipartisan panel (five Republicans, five Democrats) has revived the tired old proposal of creating the position of a cabinet-level official to oversee the nation's 15 or so intelligence agencies. To what effect or avail is anyone's guess. The report's one memorable phrase is that, "across the government, there were failures of imagination ..." Now, imagine that!Meanwhile, Democratic presidential candidate Senator John Kerry has also gotten into the act. Apparently taking his cue from the 9-11 panel, he advocates the creation of a director to oversee all facets of US intelligence, wants to double spending for foreign clandestine operations, and calls for accelerating Federal Bureau of Investigation changes in handling of domestic intelligence.
While the Senate report for the most part is more boring than informative, it does contain some snippets worth noting, mainly Conclusion 6 (last sentence): "Most, if not all, of these problems [with prewar intelligence on Iraq] stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel" (my emphasis).
Senator Kerry may want to take note - as should the innumerable "former Central Intelligence Agency operative" talking heads on US television programs bewailing the (alleged) gross inadequacy in numbers of US human-intelligence resources (case officers, agents). The Senate report - rightly - points out that, "if an [intelligence] officer willing and able to take such an assignment [undercover activity in prewar Iraq] really is 'rare' at the CIA [as the Senate committee was told], the problem is less a question of resources than a need for dramatic changes in a risk averse corporate culture".
Well, indeed. And risk aversion is hardly the only point at issue. Risk aversion, whether in economic behavior (investing) or the intelligence trade, is a sign of intellectual calcification and of lack of creativity, self-confidence and moral conviction, and can't be fixed by throwing money or warm bodies at it. Much as in business, it's unconventional initiative informed by superior knowledge and insight, a contrarian attitude, and the ability to spring surprises and act decisively that succeed in intelligence.
Mr. Erikson is more than wrong here: what's most needed is a specific mission--toppling those remaining regimes in the world which are not liberal democratic--and intelligence reform requires someone who's radically contrarian (Admiral Poindexter, for instance). Most of all though, he's right that John Kerry's stated willingness to simply enact the proposals of these commissions is lunatic. Posted by Orrin Judd at July 25, 2004 4:23 PM
OJ -- Email me.
Posted by: David Cohen at July 25, 2004 5:27 PMI've had three emails bounce back today as undeliverable, including a reply to the one you just sent me (which I got, obviously).
Anyway, when do you want me to call the contest?
Posted by: David Cohen at July 25, 2004 5:44 PMI'll move it to the front for Monday so the weekday only crowd gets a shot, then you can call it Monday pm--thanks.
I'll effort the email problem.
Posted by: oj at July 25, 2004 5:48 PMWe should have seen this coming. A bureaucratic body solves a bureaucratic problem with more bureaucracy. Makes sense to me.
Posted by: Robert Schwartz at July 25, 2004 7:26 PMIt really does seem like the worst sort of kludge, doesn't it?
Posted by: David Cohen at July 25, 2004 7:44 PMAs the cabinet-level officer for national intelligence, I nominate Joe Arpaio, sheriff of Mariposa County, AZ. Wouldn't the elites in DC just love that?
Posted by: jim hamlen at July 25, 2004 8:09 PMOrrin:
"...what's most needed is a specific mission--toppling those remaining regimes in the world which are not liberal democratic..."
Though such a specific mission might be essential to the success of most projects, it is not to intellegence. Our intellegence agencies need to detect threats not yet imagined and provide information on a variety of subjects, some now unknown -- their purpose is more varied than to just effect regime change, and by limiting it thusly, you would guarantee missing something in the future. Such covert operations are perhaps best done by a completely different type of organization.
jd:
I don't think us capable of detecting threats. But by publicizing what we know about the complete failure of regimes like Cuba, North Korea, etc. we can destabilize them.
Posted by: oj at July 25, 2004 10:54 PMOrrin:
You may be correct, but if that is the case then shouldn't we just disband the CIA etc.?
On the other hand, I think it possible that we have detected threats and prevented them, and you and I suffer from a information deficit since the successes are not publicized, so as not to reveal sources and methods. The interception of the ship off the east coast last week immediately comes to mind.
Posted by: jd watson at July 26, 2004 1:13 AM