June 11, 2004

SADDLE THE NEOCONS, THERE'S A WAR TO BE WON:

How Reagan Beat the Neocons: Those advisers in the Bush administration who regard
themselves as Reaganites ought to remember that Ronald Reagan rejected their advice. (JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, 6/11/04, NY Times)

In 1985, Mr. Reagan sent a long handwritten letter to Mikhail Gorbachev assuring him that he was prepared "to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate such a withdrawal" of the Soviets from Afghanistan. "Neither of us," he added, "wants to see offensive weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, deployed in space." Mr. Reagan eagerly sought to work with Mr. Gorbachev to rid the world of such weapons and to help the Soviet Union effect peaceful change in Eastern Europe.

This offer was far from the position taken by the neoconservative advisers who now serve under Mr. Bush. Twenty years ago in the Reagan White House, they saw no possibility for such change, and indeed many of them subscribed to the theory of "totalitarianism" as unchangeable and irreversible. Mr. Reagan was also informed that the Soviet Union was preparing for a possible pre-emptive attack on the United States. This alarmist position was taken by Team B, formed in response to the more prudently analytical position of the C.I.A. and then composed of several members of the present Bush administration. The team was headed by Richard Pipes, the Russian historian at Harvard, whose stance was summed up in the title of one of his articles: "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War."

Not only did the neocons oppose Mr. Reagan's efforts at rapprochement, they also argued against engaging in personal diplomacy with Soviet leaders. Advisers like Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld, now steering our foreign policy, held that America must escalate to achieve "nuclear dominance" and that we could only deal from a "strategy of strength." Mr. Reagan believed in a strong military, but to reassure the Soviet Union that America had no aggressive intentions, he reminded Leonid Brezhnev of just the opposite. From 1945 to 1949, the United States was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, and yet, Mr. Reagan emphasized to Mr. Brezhnev, no threat was made to use the bomb to win concessions from the Soviet Union.


There's much later in this essay that's just silly (Margaret Thatcher's "chemist" line is not her proudest moment), but the core point is correct and, more importantly, is true of the relationship between George W. Bush and the neocons now. Just as Mr. Reagan understood that Communism could not possibly succeed and that it was therefore ripe for reforming its way out of existence, so too Mr. Bush recognizes that Islamic totalitarianism can not be the basis for successful societies and is therefore ripe for reform. Thus, while the neocons hysterically call for war in places like Iran, Mr. Bush sees them about to fall into our laps. The meme abroad is that the administration is captive to the neocons, but in reality it is they who are in harness.

Posted by Orrin Judd at June 11, 2004 9:39 PM
Comments

Some truth here, but some revisionism aimed at changing the record to make folks like Diggins (and folks he favored) look better.

The comments on Team B are telling. Even that long ago, CIA needed to be blown up and reconfigured. Some things never change. The Team B guys weren't ultimately able to convince many people of that at the time. Instead, they just provided Ronald Reagan with the foreign policy that dominated his first administration (Bill Van Cleave, one of the Team B members, headed Reagan's national security campaign team and his DoD transition team, and he's the one most responsible for establishing the DoD Policy shop -- now headed by Doug Feith -- as the center of serious policy formation in every conservative administration since).

Diggins doesn't point out the main reason some of those guys cautioned against a diplomacy of rapprochement, and that was because of their experience with SALT II, when American diplomats effectively ignored Presidential directives and gave away the house (strategically speaking)! Later, some of those negotiators (including Van Cleave) would resign to testify against SALT II. They had good reasons to suspect that Reagan's assertive foreign policy could be derailed by a negotiating mindset. Fortunately, they were wrong, because Reagan held true. But experience told them it was unlikely he would do so, and they shouldn't be chided too harshly for the fact that he proved to be a greater leader than we had any right to expect!

Posted by: kevin whited at June 11, 2004 9:56 PM

Orrin,
I thought you and your readers would appreciate the following. I don't usually do more than link the few times I use comments, but this one from John Coumarianos is worth it.
Mike

http://www.innocentsabroad.blogspot.com/2004_06_06_innocentsabroad_archive.html#108698930583805872

Peace Through Strength

In addition to the mainstream media explaining the current affection for Ronald Reagan as the wish or nostalgia for a "simpler" (were the 80's simple?) time, mainstream academics (John Patrick Diggins) are trying to disjoin Reagan's foreign policy from the supposedly more aggressive variety of George W. Bush. Both of these things deny that Reagan espoused and employed a muscular foreign policy and that most Americans agreed with and still agree with that policy.

Nowhere in Diggins' silly piece today, which purports to be an assessment of the Reagan Doctrine and its relation to the current administration, is the phrase "peace through strength." Nowhere does Diggins acknowledge Reagan's belief that America has an obligation to promote liberal democracy around the world. Nowhere is there a reference to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Nowhere is there a reference to the battle Reagan waged to install missiles in Europe. Nowhere is there a reference to Reagan's controversial policies in Central America, which, thanks to his lax management style, almost brought down his presidency. Can one write about Reagan's foreign policy without mentioning these things. Apparently, you can write any drivel you want in the New York Times, provided you don't defend Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush simultaneously.

Basically, in order to separate Reagan from Bush and the dreaded "neocons," Diggins makes Reagan a kind of peacenick.

The problem with Diggins is that although he recognizes that Reagan genuinely wanted peace, he cannot understand that Reagan's strength secured the eventual peace by "rolling back" the Soviet Union. Most of Reagan's critics see the strength or muscle-flexing and don't understand that Reagan sought peace (though perhaps not peace at any price). So give Diggins credit for seeing something that most of Reagan's critics don't. Nevertheless, Diggins is as far off the mark in his assessment of Reagan as they are. He sees what most miss, but misses what most see.

Posted by: Mike Daley at June 11, 2004 10:02 PM

Kevin:

Pipes and company did though badly overestimate Soviet might. Reagan's understanding of its essential weakness is reflected in something he's often derided for, his love of Societ jokes. They told, as he understood, of the Russian peoples' understanding that Communism didn't work.

Posted by: oj at June 11, 2004 10:05 PM

Best one, which got a Russian comedian riotous laughter and big trouble in the 80's:

A Muscovite has been saving his roubles for years to buy a Lada. He finally has enough and goes to the state office to pay and place his order. After an interminable wait and much form-filling, the official says: "Well, comrade, everything seems to be in order and I am happy to tell you your car will be delivered exactly seven years from today."

"That's great", says the buyer. "What time will it be ready?"

"What do you mean, what time? It is seven years away. What does it matter what time?"

"Oh, I have to know because the plumber is coming at ten."

Posted by: Peter B at June 12, 2004 9:00 AM
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