Some so called experts, including Niall Ferguson, who really should know better, look down on the American handling of our task in Iraq; in disdain. Such observations are present in his recent New York Times op-ed on the first Iraqi (nee Mesopotamian) uprising and the lessons the British can impart from them. It is always important to learn from history; as Santayana noted; but is equally important to learn the right lessons. Such spurious misunderstandings occur in the of told observation that Iraq is not an artificial country, but cobbled together from the vilayets of Sunni Basra, tribal Sunni Baghdad and Kurdish Mosul. All of which is undoubtedly true, however the
geographic lines of Mesopotamia have remained remarkably intact for at least 500 years, excepting the period that part of the Mosul district was held by the Persians; now modern Iran. Just as the vilayets of Homs, Hamas, Aleppo & Damascus, have always comprised Syria; even they had administrative control over the province of Beirut and the Biqua valley (this is why Helen Thomas is identified as a Lebanese not Syrian American ) That fact is somehow ignored in the description of South Lebanon as having been occupied by Israel, yet Syria’s occupation of most of Lebanon, is a non factor; facilitated of course, by the Taif agreement, by Mr. Lakshdar Brahimi, and of course Saudi prince Bandar (neither of them had any interest in letting the Sunni elements govern a predominantly Shia country). Let bygones be bygones and see the lessons our Cousin’s experience in that area, has been; Examining one particularly uncontroversial website; First World War.com regarding the major engagement back in 1914; We see the following account of one of the major battles of the Mesopotamian campaign. Recall now, the US has faced some dissent in the recent past in that same area. During the actual campaign and the post war
continuing operations Keep in mind, that this was a third level campaign against a colony of just
one of the Triple Entente; the Axis of Evil of its day. Not even the battle of Gallipoli, for which
Churchill lost the post of First Sea Lord

The convoy containing Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' moved from Bombay on 16th October 1914 and sailed straight to the head of the Gulf, without stopping. It anchored off Bahrein until the 30th October. The orders given to Brig-General W.S.Delamain, commanding the Force, were to protect the oil refineries, tanks and pipeline at Abadan, and cover the landing of reinforcements if these should be required.(It was all about oil, even then)

Only if hostilities with Turkey were to become fact should he try to occupy Basra too, and to do this the rest of the 6th (Poona) Division of the Indian Army would arrive. News came through that Turkey had attacked Russia on the Black Sea coast, and war was declared on 5th November. Next day, 600 British troops, including some Royal Marines, was landed near the old fort at Fao, which they captured. The rest of the Force sailed on to a place where they could safely disembark, at Sanniyeh. Considerable difficulty was encountered, as there were no barges, tugs or small boats suitable, and land transport was poor.
A camp was eventually established, which was attacked by 400 Turks on the 11th November. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss, and the Turks withdrew some four miles. A reconnaissance in force next day also inflicted losses on the Turks near Saihan. Conditions were poor, with thick dust, mud and heat mirage. The remainder of the Division now landed.

Early on 19th November, the 16th and 18th Brigades attacked the Turk fortress at Zain, in a heavy rainstorm which slowed the advance to a walk. After an accurate bombardment the fort fell, leaving over 1000 Turkish casualties; the rest of the enemy streamed away, saved only by a mirage appearing which obscured the fleeing target of the British artillery. Cavalry were unable to pursue due to the heavy mud. British casualties in the advance of 2000 yards of open ground were 353.

The Turks tried hurriedly to block the river by towing a string of ships across and sinking them. However, a cable broke and left a gap wide enough for one vessel at a time to pass. Next morning General Sir Arthur Barrett, commanding the Division, received news from a local Arab Sheikh that the Turks had withdrawn and abandoned Basra. Two battalions (104th Wellesley's Rifles and 117th Mahrattas) embarked immediately and sailed to Basra, entering the city in the evening of the 21st November. The British officially took possession on the 23rd.
In this action, the British secured her oil supplies in the Middle East: this had immense strategic implications, as this oil field supplied most of the Royal Navy's fuel. To the Turks, the loss of Basra caused more loss of face than strategic damage. British casualties were fewer than 500. Turkish casualties were not less than 1000.

In the latter day campaign, the real confrontation began at Umm Quasr, then Basra, Not long after
this first week in the war; the first calls of quagmire were being sounded. When the sniping at the
convoys around Nazeriyah; recall Jessica Lynch’s predicament; then the sandstorm and the barrier
around Baghdad that was the tripwire to the eminent use of chemical weapons

The retreat from Ctesiphon, and the siege of Kut: 25 November 1915 - 29 April 1916
The decision to stand at Kut was a grave mistake: the initiative, until then always with the British in this campaign, passed to the Turks. The forces available to relieve the garrison were too few, and too long in coming. The fact that the Tigris Corps, coming to the relief of the garrison, fought a splendid if ultimately unsuccessful campaign was to no avail. The loss of Kut and the Division stunned the British Empire and her Allies, and provided another huge morale boost for Turkey and Germany, especially coming so soon after Britain's ignominious withdrawal from Gallipoli. The need to relieve Kut drew more forces into Mesopotamia - what impact would this force have had if it had been deployed into the Western Front at this time, when British strength and reserves were still small?

Kut-al-Amara lies on the River Tigris at its confluence with the Shatt-al-Hai (a canal of ancient history), 120 miles upstream from the British positions at Amara. The town lies in a loop of the river, with a small settlement on the opposite bank, and in 1915 was a densely-populated, filthy place. The civilian population was around 7,000; many were evicted as the army fell into the town. It had large local supplies of grain due its peacetime role as a marketplace. Kut is 500 miles upstream from Basra.
At the time of this action, daytime temperatures had cooled and were no longer a problem; night was freezing.
Click here for a map of the Middle East theatres

Following the unexpected defeat in front of Ctesiphon, the exhausted and depleted British force was urged back to the defences of Kut-al-Amara, which after an epic retreat was reached on 3rd December 1915. From Whitehall - in full knowledge that it was going to be impossible to reinforce the Army in Mesopotamia, given all of the other mounting demands - came advice to retire even further downstream. Unfortunately it came too late, for the 6th (Poona) Division was by this time besieged - and learning that 8 more Turkish Divisions, recently moved from Gallipoli, were massing near Baghdad.
Townshend was promised a rapid relief. He calculated that there were supplies in Kut for a month: he was told it might take two months for the relief force to arrive. He suggested an attempt to break out and retire - Sir John Nixon ordered him to remain and hold as many Turkish troops around Kut as possible. 10,000 fighting men were bottled up in the town; the boats got away just in time.
Townshend kept the garrison on a full daily ration. Several large-scale attacks by the Turks were beaten off, with high losses on both sides, in December 1915.
Meanwhile the attempt to assemble a force and advance to relieve the garrison failed, in a
series of bitterly-contested attacks in January and March 1916. The British lost a further
23,000 men in the attempt, and the Turks around 10,000. At one point, orders were prepared for an effort to break out of the siege. But by April 1916, the supplies had dwindled and the rate of sickness in the town had escalated to epidemic proportions. An attempt by the paddle steamer Julnar to reach the town by river failed after a valiant attempt. Small quantities of supplies were dropped from the air.
On 26th April 1916, after receiving approval from higher command and Governments, Townshend asked the Turks for a 6-day armistice and permission for 10 days food to be sent into the town. Khalil Pasha, Turkish commander, agreed, and requested talks with Townshend the next day. During the talks, Khalil demanded unconditional surrender; Townhend offered a million pounds sterling, all teh guns in the town, and a promise that the men would not again engage in fighting the Turkish army. Khalil was of a mind to accept; Enver Pasha was not. He wanted a spectacular victory, inflicting as much damage to British prestige as possible. Meanwhile the garrison in Kut used the armistice time to destroy anything useful left in the town. On the 29th, Townshend surrendered. It was the greatest military disaster ever to have befallen teh British Army.
But worse was to come. Townshend himself went into a comfortable if isolated captivity. The sick, unfit, undernourished men of the garrison were force-marched, many beaten savagely, many killed by acts of wanton cruelty. More than 3,000 of those who surrendered at Kut were murdered by the Turks in this way, while in captivity. Those who survived were little more than skeleton when they were 2 years later released or exchanged.
The British Army lost 227 British and 204 Indian officers, with 12,828 other ranks - of which 2,592 were British - when the garrison surrendered. The Turks murdered more than 1,700 of the British other ranks, and possibly as many as 3,000 of the Indian troops, while in captivity. Losses during the fighting during the siege were approximately 2,000, and the relieving force lost 23,000 in the attempt.
The British Order of Battle

The decision to stand at Kut was a grave mistake: the initiative, until then always with the British in this campaign, passed to the Turks. The forces available to relieve the garrison were too few, and too long in coming. The fact that the Tigris Corps, coming to the relief of the garrison, fought a splendid if ultimately unsuccessful campaign was to no avail. The loss of Kut and the Division stunned the British Empire and her Allies, and provided another huge morale boost for Turkey and Germany, especially coming so soon after Britain's ignominious withdrawal from Gallipoli. The need to relieve Kut drew more forces into Mesopotamia - what impact would this force have had if it had been deployed into the Western Front at this time, when British strength and reserves were still small?

One wonders how the expertly trained Indian Civil Service, missed these points in their planning. After all what was so important about Kut:

Kut-al-Amara lies on the River Tigris at its confluence with the Shatt-al-Hai (a canal of ancient history), 120 miles upstream from the British positions at Amara. The town lies in a loop of the river, with a small settlement on the opposite bank, and in 1915 was a densely-populated, filthy place. The civilian population was around 7,000; many were evicted as the army fell into the town. It had large local supplies of grain due its peacetime role as a marketplace. Kut is 500 miles upstream from Basra.
At the time of this action, daytime temperatures had cooled and were no longer a problem; night was freezing.

Following the
unexpected defeat in front of Ctesiphon,(one recalls this was where the Iraq
regime had placed artillery atop a ziggurat) the exhausted and depleted British force was urged back to the defences of Kut-al-Amara, which after an epic retreat was reached on 3rd December 1915. From Whitehall - in full knowledge that it was going to be impossible to reinforce the Army in Mesopotamia, given all of the other mounting demands - came advice to retire even further downstream. Unfortunately it came too late, for the 6th (Poona) Division was by this time besieged - and learning that 8 more Turkish Divisions, recently moved from Gallipoli, were massing near Baghdad.
Townshend kept the garrison on a full daily ration. Several large-scale attacks by the Turks were beaten off, with high losses on both sides, in December 1915. Meanwhile the attempt to assemble a force and advance to relieve the garrison failed, in a series of bitterly-contested attacks in January and March 1916. The British lost a further 23,000 men in the attempt, and the Turks around 10,000. At one point, orders were prepared for an effort to break out of the siege. But by April 1916, the supplies had dwindled and the rate of sickness in the town had escalated to epidemic proportions. An attempt by the paddle steamer Julnar to reach the town by river failed after a valiant attempt. Small quantities of supplies were dropped from the air. (I say, if the current Blair or Bush administration had allowed anything like this; they would not only have been deposed; but their might have been an actual revolution; possibly with a Cromwell like figure waiting in the wings)

On the 29th, Townshend surrendered. It was the greatest military disaster ever to have befallen the British Army. But worse was to come. Townshend himself went into a comfortable if isolated captivity. The sick, unfit, undernourished men of the garrison were force-marched, many beaten savagely, many killed by acts of wanton cruelty. More than 3,000 of those who surrendered at Kut were murdered by the Turks in this way, while in captivity. Those who survived were little more than skeleton when they were 2 years later released or exchanged. The British Army lost 227 British and 204 Indian officers, with 12,828 other ranks - of which 2,592 were British - when the garrison surrendered. The Turks murdered more than 1,700 of the British other ranks, and possibly as many as 3,000 of the Indian troops, while in captivity. Losses during the fighting during the siege were approximately 2,000, and the relieving force lost 23,000 in the attempt.

The convoy containing Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' moved from Bombay on 16th October 1914 and sailed straight to the head of the Gulf, without stopping. It anchored off Bahrein until the 30th October. The orders given to Brig-General W.S.Delamain, commanding the Force, were to protect the oil refineries, tanks and pipeline at Abadan, and cover the landing of reinforcements if these should be required. Only if hostilities with Turkey were to become fact should he try to occupy Basra too, and to do this the rest of the 6th (Poona) Division of the Indian Army would arrive. News came through that Turkey had attacked Russia on the Black Sea coast, and war was declared on 5th November.
Next day, 600 British troops, including some Royal Marines, was landed near the old fort at Fao, which they captured. The rest of the Force sailed on to a place where they could safely disembark, at Sanniyeh. Considerable difficulty was encountered, as there were no barges, tugs or small boats suitable, and land transport was poor. These were factors that remained throughout the Mesopotamia campaign.
A camp was eventually established, which was attacked by 400 Turks on the 11th November. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss, and the Turks withdrew some four miles. A reconnaissance in force next day also inflicted losses on the Turks near Saihan. Conditions were poor, with thick dust, mud and heat mirage. The remainder of the Division now landed.
Early on 19th November, the 16th and 18th Brigades attacked the Turk fortress at Zain, in a heavy rainstorm which slowed the advance to a walk. After an accurate bombardment the fort fell, leaving over 1000 Turkish casualties; the rest of the enemy streamed away, saved only by a mirage appearing which obscured the fleeing target of the British artillery. Cavalry were unable to pursue due to the heavy mud. British casualties in the advance of 2000 yards of open ground were 353.

The Turks tried hurriedly to block the river by towing a string of ships across and sinking them. However, a cable broke and left a gap wide enough for one vessel at a time to pass. Next morning General Sir Arthur Barrett, commanding the Division, received news from a local Arab Sheikh that the Turks had withdrawn and abandoned Basra. Two battalions (104th Wellesley's Rifles and 117th Mahrattas) embarked immediately and sailed to Basra, entering the city in the evening of the 21st November. The British officially took possession on the 23rd.
In this action, the British secured her oil supplies in the Middle East: this had immense strategic implications, as this oil field supplied most of the Royal Navy's fuel. To the Turks, the loss of Basra caused more loss of face than strategic damage.
British casualties were fewer than 500. Turkish casualties were not less than 1000.
The British Order of Battle
Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' and 6th (Poona) Division were the formations that fought this battle.
Forward a few days, to Capture of Qurna
The retreat from Ctesiphon, and the siege of Kut: 25 November 1915 - 29 April 1916
The decision to stand at Kut was a grave mistake: the initiative, until then always with the British in this campaign, passed to the Turks. The forces available to relieve the garrison were too few, and too long in coming. The fact that the Tigris Corps, coming to the relief of the garrison, fought a splendid if ultimately unsuccessful campaign was to no avail. The loss of Kut and the Division stunned the British Empire and her Allies, and provided another huge morale boost for Turkey and Germany, especially coming so soon after Britain's ignominious withdrawal from Gallipoli. The need to relieve Kut drew more forces into Mesopotamia - what impact would this force have had if it had been deployed into the Western Front at this time, when British strength and reserves were still small?
Landscape for battle

Kut-al-Amara lies on the River Tigris at its confluence with the Shatt-al-Hai (a canal of ancient history), 120 miles upstream from the British positions at Amara. The town lies in a loop of the river, with a small settlement on the opposite bank, and in 1915 was a densely-populated, filthy place. The civilian population was around 7,000; many were evicted as the army fell into the town. It had large local supplies of grain due its peacetime role as a marketplace. Kut is 500 miles upstream from Basra.
At the time of this action, daytime temperatures had cooled and were no longer a problem; night was freezing.
Click here for a map of the Middle East theatres
What happened?

was going to be impossible to reinforce the Army in Mesopotamia, given all of the other mounting demands - came advice to retire even further downstream. Unfortunately it came too late, for the 6th (Poona) Division was by this time besieged - and learning that 8 more Turkish Divisions, recently moved from Gallipoli, were massing near Baghdad.
Townshend was promised a rapid relief. He calculated that there were supplies in Kut for a month: he was told it might take two months for the relief force to arrive. He suggested an attempt to break out and retire - Sir John Nixon ordered him to remain and hold as many Turkish troops around Kut as possible. 10,000 fighting men were bottled up in the town; the boats got away just in time.
Townshend kept the garrison on a full daily ration. Several large-scale attacks by the Turks were beaten off, with high losses on both sides, in December 1915.
Meanwhile the attempt to assemble a force and advance to relieve the garrison failed, in a

series of bitterly-contested attacks in January and March 1916. The British lost a further
23,000 men in the attempt, and the Turks around 10,000. At one point, orders were prepared for an effort to break out of the siege. But by April 1916, the supplies had dwindled and the rate of sickness in the town had escalated to epidemic proportions. An attempt by the paddle steamer Julnar to reach the town by river failed after a valiant attempt. Small quantities of supplies were dropped from the air.
On 26th April 1916, after receiving approval from higher command and Governments, Townshend asked the Turks for a 6-day armistice and permission for 10 days food to be sent into the town. Khalil Pasha, Turkish commander, agreed, and requested talks with Townshend the next day. During the talks, Khalil demanded unconditional surrender; Townhend offered a million pounds sterling, all teh guns in the town, and a promise that the men would not again engage in fighting the Turkish army. Khalil was of a mind to accept; Enver Pasha was not. He wanted a spectacular victory, inflicting as much damage to British prestige as possible. Meanwhile the garrison in Kut used the armistice time to destroy anything useful left in the town. On the 29th, Townshend surrendered. It was the greatest military disaster ever to have befallen teh British Army.
But worse was to come. Townshend himself went into a comfortable if isolated captivity. The sick, unfit, undernourished men of the garrison were force-marched, many beaten savagely, many killed by acts of wanton cruelty. More than 3,000 of those who surrendered at Kut were murdered by the Turks in this way, while in captivity. Those who survived were little more than skeleton when they were 2 years later released or exchanged.
The British Army lost 227 British and 204 Indian officers, with 12,828 other ranks - of which 2,592 were British - when the garrison surrendered. The Turks murdered more than 1,700 of the British other ranks, and possibly as many as 3,000 of the Indian troops, while in captivity. Losses during the fighting during the siege were approximately 2,000, and the relieving force lost 23,000 in the attempt.
The British Order of Battle
6th (Poona) Division was the formation that fought this battle, and died in captivity.
The attempt to relieve Kut begins, at Sheik Sa'ad
Further reading: Try Major E.W.C.Sandes 'In Kut and Captivity', E.H.Jones 'The road to En-Dor',P.W.Long 'The Other Ranks of Kut'