April 7, 2004

MATE:

Searching for Bobby Fischer's Platonic Form (Kenneth Silber,  04/06/2004, Tech Central Station)

No doubt, many college freshmen have rolled their eyes at the uselessness of Philosophy 101 when asked whether there exist perfect circles or other ideal entities. But a great deal rides on the longstanding philosophical debate about abstract objects. If, say, the number 12 has an existence independent of its particular manifestations in egg cartons and the like, then a view that the world consists solely of physical objects is inadequate.
 
This has potential religious implications; in a recent TCS essay, Edward Feser identified Platonism, or belief in a realm of abstract entities, as a key assumption underlying Western religion. Of course, believing in perfect circles does not necessarily entail believing in God; philosopher Keith Augustine has defended a naturalistic worldview that takes abstract objects into account. So, while debating Platonism will not settle an argument about religion, it does shake up easy assumptions about what does and does not exist.
 
To my mind, Platonism (whether in religious form or not) is a dispiriting philosophy. Its emphasis on another realm seems conducive to distaste for the messy, familiar world. Furthermore, as physicist Lee Smolin noted in his excellent book The Life of the Cosmos, Platonism calls into question whether there is any such thing as novelty. If the contents of the universe are just a playing-out of possibilities that exist in a timeless realm, then there is nothing truly new about them. Every flower, every mountain, every painting is merely a sample from a preexisting set of possible flowers, mountains or paintings.
 
What does this have to do with chess? The game actually complicates the question of whether abstract objects exist. Consider the Ruy Lopez, a common chess opening named after Ruy Lopez de Segura, a priest and chess expert in 16th-century Spain. White opens with a pawn, knight and bishop; black parries with pawn and knight, then decides how to respond to the bishop. The subsequent moves carry numerous, ramifying possibilities.
 
The various lines of attack and defense following the Ruy Lopez opening have different pros and cons. Some strategies are better than others. (The Steinitz Defense, where black pushes the queen's pawn on move three, is regarded as a bit dubious.) But no one has yet figured out any definitive best strategy for black or white. Hence, the Ruy Lopez is still played frequently by grandmasters in tournament competition, with varying outcomes.
 
Did the Ruy Lopez exist before its 16th-century namesake started playing it? A Platonist might say it did, as part of an abstract set of all possible chess openings. But chess itself has a finite history. The game originated around the seventh century A.D., and its modern rules became standard in the 15th century, not long before Ruy Lopez de Segura was playing. Platonic ideals are normally defined as timeless, yet in this case they seem also to be historically grounded. The world of abstractions seems to depend on our world.
 
Perhaps in some sense, all chess moves, positions and games are "out there," but they have a rather limited existence if nobody plays them. Interestingly, it appears physically impossible for any computer or other material entity ever to store complete information about the game. By some estimates, the number of possible chess games exceeds the number of particles in the universe.

The chess example also raises precisely the opposite, and perhaps more interesting, question: do material objects exist?

I went to caddie camp on Nantucket Island with the number one under-18 chess player in Montreal. He, like most great players, could beat you blind-folded. That is, he had no need to observe a physical board and pieces, he could see them perfectly in his mind. Likewise, where we lesser players may have to stare at each individual piece and sketch out its possible moves one at a time, he (again, as any great player) was could calculate the possible moves and permutation therefrom for all the pieces. Indeed, he'd have had numerous entire games stored away in his mind so that such analysis was hardly even necessary.

So, here you have a French-Canadian teen-ager whose head contained multitudes of "virtual" chess games and millions (billions? trillions?) of moves, each just as real to him as any on an "actual" board. What then is the difference between the two--the virtual and the actual? Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we make him Burgess Meredith in that Twilight Zone episode where he's a librarian and the last man left on Earth. Then let us paralyze him, but allow him his faculties. Retreating into his mind he plays out chess games. In what sense is chess gone from the world if it continues in his mind? Of this much we can be certain, the rook he holds in his mind has no different sense of itself than the wooden chess piece I hold in my hand.

You can see where this is headed right? If this question arises just because of some random kid and a chess game, then suppose greater beings than we imagine ourselves to be, who in their heads play a game called Existence. In effect, they play a mental version of Sims, only we and everything we think we perceive around us are the sims.

If that sounds a bit too esoteric to grasp, think of the movie The Matrix. There is no difference in terms of his own perceptions between the world as Neo sees it when he's just jacked into the big computer and when he is removed. Indeed, there is no way for anyone within the Matrix to determine whether they have a material existence or are simply imaginary computer constructs. In fact, there is no way for us, because we are wholly dependent on sensation, to determine whether anything exists outside our thoughts or even if they are our thoughts or we are merely the thoughts of someone/something else. For all we know we're no different than the chess pieces in some Canuck's head.

Posted by Orrin Judd at April 7, 2004 12:54 PM
Comments

It's interesting (to me) that chess is decidable in principle; that is, it is definitely the case that either

a) White can always win
b) Black can always win
c) If neither player makes a mistake, the result is always a tie.

In this sense, chess is no more interesting than tic tac toe... except that it may be impossible (given current physics theories) to actually search all the possible games to determine which of a,b,c is actually the case.

It's possible some final grandmaster will find an unbeatable opening and prove a or b; quantum computers might manage the brute force solution.

But does a question to which we will likely never know the answer actually have one?

Posted by: Mike Earl at April 7, 2004 2:13 PM

Well, it might be closer than we think.

There are 'only' about 10^43 to 10^48 distinct positions in chess (a chess position can be totally described in 160 bits or less, and 2^160 =~ 10^48).

If you are interested in imperfect but unbeatable play (meaning it won't find a win/draw in the minimum number of moves), then an interesting prospect appears. A large part of the game tree is nonsense, filled with ridiculous positions and grotesque material mismatches. A good conjecture is that the total number of positions that need to be hashed is the square root of the total number of positions, or at most 10^24 positions. A standard chess program could solve the positions with grotesque material mismatches, and would need to reference the 10^24 or so other, non-ridiculous positions. It works out to be between about 10^13 Terabytes and 10^16 TB of memory. Er, that is still a lot :)

I note that the largest database today (French Telecom) is about 30 Terabytes....if a Moore's Law of memory holds up for a while, then we might see something like this in a few generations.

Posted by: Bruce Cleaver at April 7, 2004 2:42 PM

Esoteric? Every adolescent imagines such a thing.

It is a part of growing up to realize that the mind can imagine things that cannot be and stop fretting about it?

Or do you believe in the real existence of, say, Quetzalcoatl?

Posted by: Harry Eagar at April 7, 2004 2:44 PM

As far as Matrix-style illusions, Robin Hanson at George Mason University provides some fascinating arguments that we are almost certainly living in a simulation (the mind of God?). I can't say I've digested all his arguments, but they're worth considering.

Also, count me in as a Platonist.

Posted by: Bruce Cleaver at April 7, 2004 2:48 PM

For all we know, that is true.

For all we know, it isn't.

What we do know for sure, is that it is undecidable.

I think I'll file it under "WHOGAS*"

*Who Gives A S[darn]t.

Posted by: Jeff Guinn at April 7, 2004 3:22 PM

Exactly. You get the same result (at least up to death) whether simple materialism explains everything or we're characters in a dream sequence of the Big Spook.

No point worrying about what you cannot affect.

Posted by: Harry Eagar at April 7, 2004 3:32 PM

Harry:

Well put, the adolescent learns that to live is to have faith in the unprovable, because all is unprovable.

Posted by: oj at April 7, 2004 3:41 PM

Cool, the Guinnine Creed.

Posted by: oj at April 7, 2004 3:47 PM

I didn't learn that.

Posted by: Harry Eagar at April 7, 2004 9:16 PM

"If that sounds a bit too esoteric to grasp..."

So you mean, like, we could all just be, like, figments of like, some super alien's imagination? Like, woah man, far out!

Heh heh.


Posted by: Brit at April 8, 2004 5:11 AM

Actually, to live involves inhale, exhale, repeat.

One other thing the adolescent learns is that granting one or two obvious things axiomatically makes everything else provable.

Posted by: Jeff Guinn at April 8, 2004 7:46 AM

I'm not as much a platonist as I am a multi-dimensionalist: it is merely an assumption that an "abstract" "higher" world would necessarily be a "perfect" one.

See the "Flatland" series by various authors to show how higher dimensional beings and dimensions can, and cannot, interact with lower dimensional ones. One could postulate a nation-state of such beings following (or being forced to observe) some form of Starfleet's prime directive of non-interference (which, by the way, was never depicted as a total ban, but has developed nuanced loopholes and exceptions in the paper literature).

Harry's bleatings that there are no such higher dimensions that HE, harry, has observed, makes him sound like the pre-visitation square of the original book. How provincial.

Thus, it was with interest that I noted a recent Computer Science paper detailing a method for breaking out of a handheld's Java Machine sandbox. The point of the sandbox is to deliberately impose a set of known behaviors which analysis has shown cannot, in combination with an analyzed and conforming compiler, Virtual Machine, and security policy, be combined in any conceivable combination of operations to access memory that is not controlled by the program itself (I.e. the password database in another application in a different sandbox). In other words, the attempt of the Java virtual machine is to create a "closed" world, where any possible memory access cannot reach outside of the memory space expressly granted to the progam. The similarity of the closed VM memory universe to the physical universe, whose natural laws appear to be restricted to three dimensional interactions, is at least obvious to me, if not to harry: The inability to "see" a fourth spatial dimension is less due to the lack of one than the possiblity that each dimension is closed with respect to lower dimensions, but open to higher ones.

The trick for breaking out of the Java VM appears to be to allocate and initialize large blocks of memory, AND WAIT FOR A COSMIC RAY TO FLIP A BIT. the discussion is pretty involved, but the authors of the paper (http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~sudhakar/papers/memerr.pdf) actually wrote the program and succeeded in breaking out of the VM, simulating cosmic ray bit flips by heating a PDA to induce memory errors.

What's so intriguing about the feat is that, NORMALLY, such bit flips would cause most PDAs to either crash or abort the program: It's seen as a bug. A carefully crafted program, however, TURNS THE BUG INTO A FEATURE, and is able to leverage the incident into a security breakout about a third of the time.

The physical analog suggests a strategy of laying out a network of sensors to sense "unusual events", and use the information gathered to "somehow" leverage a foothold into the fourth dimension from the third.

Cynics would say, "Yeah, and right THERE in your plan, is where the miracle takes place to make it all work."

EXACTLY. The events the network would be looking for LITERALLY WOULD BE MIRACLES. Harry and the pure materialists would dismiss reports of such as "aberrations" or "fabrications", just as a PDA would crash or dismiss the program affected by a cosmic ray as an "errant" program. This puts new meaning to the saying "Be prepared".

Constructing a sensor array of sorts and waiting for a putatively rare event may be dismissed By harry and cohorts as silly and idealistic, but establishing the answer to the question of whether protons decay involved constructing a very specific sensor in a very specific location and waiting a LOOOOONG time. Similar to the search for proton decay, it would have taken only a few events to prove proton decay, but the lack of evidence could not be used as PROOF that proton decay didn't happen: The half life could be longer than estimated, or perhaps the sensor design is flawed in some way.

Finally, the religion that Harry apparently distains and opposes most coincidentally still promises a continuation of trans-dimensional events of the type Harry dismisses as impossible. That same religion, however, asserts that such events happen and are visible only to those who are prepared: those who believe. Is it a coincidence that everything Harry and the materialists say and do are precisely calculated to ensure that NOBODY BELIEVES?

Makes one question whether Harry and company are fellow inmates in this three dimensional asylum, or are collaborating with the keepers...

Posted by: Ptah at April 8, 2004 7:59 AM

Ptah:

You weren't by any chance foaming at the mouth when you typed that, were you?

Look, you might be right.

I might be in the Matrix.
I might be a brain in a vat, being prodded by scientists to have fake sensory perceptions. One of those scientists might be Harry.
We might all be figments in God's imagination.
We might all be figments the imagination of a superbeing from another dimension.
Or two superbeings.
Or a million and twelve superbeings.

There are infinite other alternatives to the materialist view that "this is the universe, everything is real and this is all there is".

I can't disprove any of them.

The question is: so what?

Posted by: Brit at April 8, 2004 8:15 AM

Brit:

Or a God or gods could have Created everything or it could just be some blind natural process... All are equallt silly when you examine them. Though some are more elegant than others.

Posted by: oj at April 8, 2004 8:26 AM

Yes, they might be 'equally silly'. We all have those 'naked lunch' moments....(what is 'matter'? And why?).

But some things are supported by physical evidence, and others are not.

The next question after "so what?", is: "so what reason do I have to believe it?"

Posted by: Brit at April 8, 2004 8:34 AM

Brit:

Physical evidence is indeed a good reason to give credence. No one here denies that. It is your(pl) dogmatic rejection of other kinds of evidence that comes between us.

Posted by: Peter B at April 8, 2004 9:07 AM

Peter:

Agreed.

Posted by: Brit at April 8, 2004 9:08 AM

Count me as a non-Platonist.

There may be larger dimensions, and inaccessible realms, but that is not the same as saying that the abstractions of physical objects are in some way separate objects in and of themselves, and in some way more perfect than the objects that they describe. Perfection is a mental state within a brain, and not a property that can be attributed to an object. It is a subjective value - notice that the idea of the 'perfect' woman can be greatly affected by the liberal use of alcohol.

Posted by: Robert Duquette at April 8, 2004 1:11 PM

Peter/Brit:

You've both missed the point completely. There's no such thing as physical evidence--all we have (assuming there's a we) are mental perceptions.

Posted by: oj at April 8, 2004 2:36 PM

Jeff:

You have faith that you breathe, etc.

Posted by: oj at April 8, 2004 2:37 PM

Ptah's elaboration boils down to the psi-researcher's explanation of why, when you put controls on the experiment, the observed effects disappear -- the shyness effect.

The power chooses not to be observed by skeptics.

Well, that's ONE possibility.

Posted by: Harry Eagar at April 8, 2004 4:38 PM

Harry:

No, it's the Heisenberg principle writ large--what we observe we change.

Posted by: oj at April 8, 2004 5:02 PM

OJ

No - mental perceptions MIGHT be all we have. You can't prove that there's no such thing as physical evidence.

So, so what?

Posted by: Brit at April 8, 2004 7:13 PM

First, convince me that y'all are sentient. Then we'll worry about whether we exist.

Posted by: David Cohen at April 8, 2004 7:37 PM

Brit:

So all is merely choices between faiths.

Posted by: oj at April 8, 2004 10:43 PM

Robert is right to bring up Berkley. OJ is spouting pure Berkelian idealism.

Most people tend to be happy with Samuel Johnson's famous, if anti-intellectual, refutation.

But funnily enough, OJ's old pal David Stove (useless as he was on Darwinism) did a decent job of skewering the argument that because we perceive things, only our perceptions exist.

He called it The Worst Argument in the World (TM).

Equivalent to: we have eyes, therefore we can't see.


Posted by: Brit at April 9, 2004 1:39 PM

Brit:

Of course we're satisfied with Johnson, that's the point. He doesn't offer an argument to refute idealism--there is none--he pitches a fit.

Posted by: oj at April 9, 2004 1:50 PM

Indeed, though I gave the Johnson link more for its amusement value.

Here are some more substantial arguments to consider:

1)Our old friend Ockham's Razor offers a refutation to Berkeley's idealism.

The simplest explanation for why I have these perceptions of things is that these things exist.

Berkeley's insistence that a busy God is constantly arranging these perceptions to make sure they're all consistent requires rather more of an effort to believe.

2) If you accept idealism, why not solipsism?

3) The reason Stove called it The Worst Argument in the World is because the logic of:

a) I have perceptions of things
b) therefore those things can't exist.

is flawed.

Posted by: Brit at April 10, 2004 4:20 AM

Brit:

Yes, those are all the jesuitical arguments that we substitute for reason:

We can conceive of God therefore He must exist. Every effect we see has a cause therefore there must be a First Cause. etc.

We all simply settle on Faith, because Reason fails its own test.

Posted by: oj at April 10, 2004 8:38 AM

OJ:

I think you've got an argument in there, but you're struggling to formulate it.

In this thread you're oscillating between two different arguments.

The first, which is your usual one, is that "a belief in the true existence of the material world, and indeed in the existence of reason, is just another faith."

What this means is: "it is just as possible to doubt the material world, and indeed reason itself, as it is to doubt God, or that I'm not plugged into the Matrix etc."

That is undoubtedly true, but...."so what?"

The second argument is probably forced by the "so what?" question. This is your positive assertion above that "There's no such thing as physical evidence--all we have (assuming there's a we) are mental perceptions."

In other words, you positively assert that idealism is true. There is no such thing as the material world independent of perceptions, or at least, if there is an independent material world, we can never know it.

To which my question is: "That may be true. I can't disprove that. But I doubt it. So why should I believe it?"

Posted by: Brit at April 11, 2004 4:28 AM

Brit:

Isn't that the same argument? All we do have is our perceptions, or think we do--even that assumes that we exist and are not someone else's perception. All we can do is have faith that we do exist and our perceptions are mostly worthwhile. We start from a point of faith. Nothing, contrary to the claim of science, can ever be disproven.

You shouldn't believe it. No one truly believes. No one is truly rational. It is intolerable to the mind. Just believe. Kick the rock and move on.

Posted by: oj at April 11, 2004 8:51 AM

OJ:

They're very different arguments, and require different responses.

One states, correctly, that it is possible that something may not be true.

The other asserts, less justifiably, that something is definitely NOT true.

It's equivalent to the difference between arguing that OJ Simpson might not have done it, and positively stating that he was innocent.

Posted by: Brit at April 12, 2004 6:02 AM

Brit:

No, it isn't.

It is true that we can have no rational proof of existence. Reason subverts itself anmd leaves only faith--or common sense if you feel better calling it that.

Posted by: oj at April 12, 2004 8:05 AM

"It is true that we can have no rational proof of existence."

Agreed. And neither can you prove that there is NO such thing as objective reality. So...

"Reason subverts itself and leaves only faith--or common sense if you feel better calling it that."

What does that mean?

Does it mean that we all just assume that objective reality exists and get on with it? If that's what you mean by 'common sense', I agree.

So is that your argument against Darwinism?

Posted by: Brit at April 12, 2004 11:51 AM

No, it's the first argument, that as a choice of faith's it is aesthetically unappealing. The final argument is that it is not a science.

Posted by: oj at April 12, 2004 12:16 PM
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