VITIATING YOUR OWN "VITAL":

Iraq: A Short History of What Went Wrong (Harvey Sicherman, 2/02/04, History News Network)

The confluence of a force too small to run an occupation and a confidence too large about quickly reviving an Iraqi administration produced dire results. American commanders, perhaps suspicious of their success, kept their troops deployed for battle. In any event, very few had been prepared for police work or civic action; and almost all were totally unfamiliar with Iraq's complex tribal, clan, and religious conflicts. The electrical, water, and even oil pumping facilities spared by American bombs were looted and ruined by Iraqis, some of whom even looted national libraries and museums. The victors seemed paralyzed, without orders or purpose. Even Saddam, his sons, and their closest henchmen, if a captured bodyguard's testimony is to be believed, were able to move about fairly easily as they regrouped in the aftermath of sudden collapse.

Washington proved slow to apprehend the trouble. The Administration warned off Iran and Syria from interfering in Iraq while reciting the mantra of "liberation, no occupation." Some in the Pentagon thought that the four divisions in Iraq (the fourth having arrived too late for the fighting) might be reduced to 1 by autumn. Meanwhile, the President busied himself with the diplomacy of the "Road Map" for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Two weeks into May, however, the warning signs from Iraq jolted the White House into action. [...]

Despite the "summer of discontent," the Bush team regained a semblance of balance by early August. Once convinced that resistance was organized and that Saddam's survival was a growing danger, the administration moved decisively to squelch far more potent political challenges than those offered by the sixteen-word crisis. The first was the spreading conviction that the Americans did not know what to do in Iraq and that Bush lacked a "Plan B" to deal with unexpected dangers, especially the continued American casualties. A dimension of this danger was the lack of a rotation scheme that left the Third Division in limbo. Its brigades had fought the war, taken over the more difficult of the occupation zones and had been deployed nearly a year. They were tired and some were vocal. Their families were increasingly upset.

In mid- and late-July, the Bush Administration took action on both fronts. Bremer put a "Plan B" into place by convincing a disparate group of exiles and local opposition, notably the major Shiite organization, to join a Governing Council that would help to run Iraq, pending a constitution and elections. Significant Iraqi political forces thus decided that America's work in Iraq could help them after all. Meanwhile, the anti-Saddam campaign achieved a notable success. On July 22, American forces, acting on a tip (worth a $30 million reward) cornered and killed Saddam's sons, Uday and Qusay, in Tikrit, the clan's hometown. This did not immediately diminish attacks on coalition forces but it did call forth another flood of intelligence on both Ba'ath operations and Saddam's whereabouts. Almost simultaneously, Bremer formally unveiled a strategy in Iraq that envisaged elections sooner rather than later. And on July 23, another piece fell into place when the Pentagon announced a new rotation plan that would bring the Third Division home by October.

The long hot summer of discontent thus ended in a partial recovery. On the plus side, the occupation had begun to take hold with every prospect of killing Saddam soon; the Pentagon was adjusting its plan to avoid excessive stress on its forces; and, with improved security, Iraqi recovery and international aid might move forward. The American enterprise had also begun to attract more allied support, signified by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's healing visit in mid-July.

Still, the costs of miscalculation had been high. A vital month was lost because the United States lacked sufficient forces to establish an occupation.

There's nothing wrong with criticizing either the war itself or the conduct of the war and post-war, but you can't help but sound silly talking about how slowly a government moved when you yourself note that by that you mean it took a few weeks or when you refer to a "vital" month immediately after you note that it had no long term effect.

Posted by Orrin Judd at February 4, 2004 9:00 AM