SUCCESS THROUGH FAILURE:

A Success Worth Noting in Iraq (The New York Times, 2/08/04)

In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and its defeat the next year by an American-led military coalition, the United Nations Security Council imposed oil export restrictions, a ban on the import of weapons and potential weapons ingredients, and a series of disarmament requirements to be monitored by aggressive international inspections.

None of the measures worked exactly as intended. All were met with Iraqi deceptions and resistance. Oil export sanctions were evaded with increasing success. United Nations inspectors were repeatedly obstructed and often felt threatened. They were withdrawn in advance of American bombing strikes in 1998, and not permitted to return until 2002. Yet the totality of these measures, particularly the prohibitions on importing weapons and their ingredients, now appears to have worked surprisingly well, apparently persuading Mr. Hussein that he would never be able to rebuild his weapons programs so long as sanctions remained in effect. That was exactly the message Washington wanted to send.

The most crucial sanction banned the import of all prohibited weapons and of any ingredient that could conceivably be used to make them, including many items that also had consumer and medical uses. To reinforce this arms embargo, Iraqi oil exports were initially banned. Then, under the oil-for-food program, oil revenues were channeled through a United Nations bank account, so that Saddam Hussein could not use them to purchase prohibited weapons material on the black market.

Oil export restrictions became increasingly porous over the years, and American authorities are now investigating some of the companies and individuals that may have helped Iraq bypass these sanctions. By 2001, Baghdad was collecting as much as $1 billion a year in illicit oil revenues, money that many feared Mr. Hussein could have used to import prohibited weapons ingredients. It now seems clear that he did not, most likely because he could not. Potential sellers did not want to be caught breaking the arms embargo. Instead, illicit oil money most likely went to build palaces, pay security officials and the Republican Guard, and fatten the Hussein family's foreign bank accounts. [...]

Sanctions are hardly a perfect tool. They hurt innocent civilians, require broad international enforcement and work best when backed up by effective inspection arrangements. But under the right conditions, they offer American administrations an effective alternative to military force, which, it is now clearer than ever, should be employed only as a last resort.

If you can explain how someone can write this: "None of the measures worked exactly as intended. All were met with Iraqi deceptions and resistance." And they can write this: "By 2001, Baghdad was collecting as much as $1 billion a year in illicit oil revenues, money that many feared Mr. Hussein could have used to import prohibited weapons ingredients. It now seems clear that he did not..." And can then argue that the sanctions--which were on the verge of breaking down completely at the time--were a reliable tool of American policy, you'll have to explain it to the rest of us.

One would also note that the first sentence of the editorial is a bald-faced lie: "The Bush administration offered two reasons to wage unilateral war in Iraq — Saddam Hussein was stockpiling vast quantities of weapons, and efforts to contain him through sanctions and inspections were hopeless." What the administration argued in the sanctions portion of its case for war was that Saddam was violating UN resolutions and that someone had to enforce them or else the UN would cease to be a serious international authority. The editorial acknowledges, but is untroubled by, the violations, suggesting that the editors of the Times themselves don't take the UN too seriously.

Since that series of resolutions set the terms for the temporary cessation of hostilities in the first Gulf War, the Times argument essentially boils down to the notion that our enemies need not abide by international agreements, even those agreements which are the conditions for halting wars. Apparently they don't take agreements between nations too seriously either.

Now, if all that's what they're trying to say, we agree with them: they've made the case for getting out of the UN and against Kyoto, the ICC, the Geneva conventions, etc. Given a world in which no one takes international institutions seriously and no one can be expected to adhere to international agreements, there's really no alternative but to engage in unilateral action to achieve our national interests. We're down with that.

Posted by Orrin Judd at February 8, 2004 10:04 AM