I'm glad the WSJ is pointing it out -- it bears repeating again & again (too stiffen resolve), and I also hope that the American public gets an idea that their patience & dedicaction will be needed for a while.

Well, I hope we try, too, but that is not

enough to make me optimistic.



Yesterday would have been a good day

for the Muslim moderates of the world

to march in the streets for liberty,

or if not that to issue statements in favor

of liberty, or if not that, to at least offer

a prayer at Friday services for liberty.



That they didn't is suggestive.

PJ;



Like Harry, I'm actually quite pessimistic about our chance for building a self-ordered Iraq. But I fully support the invasion and our efforts to do so. What choice do we really have? The potential payoff is so large that even a small chance of success is worth the effort, not to mention that I can't see us being any worse off for trying and failing than never having tried at all.

It's a bit rich to go back two centuries and make some comparison with a French dictator's 'colonial' pretensions. Jarring compared to today even to see the intellectual class following in the footsteps of the military as cheerleaders. So much for the Academy.



Not only that but French style colonianism was quite different to the British (who kicked Napoleon out of Egypt and stayed for a lot longer).A lot has changed since those days anyway, even since the British "rule" of Iraq last century (misguided and venal as it was).

AOG - I judge things the same way you do - I may be more optimistic than most, because I believe if we keep trying we will eventually succeed. But we have to try, even if success is extremely unlikely.

AOG,

While I agree that the "potential payoff is...large" I think that the better rational for action is provided by the tremendous cost of inaction.



Alastair,

Still, while the British (though they did make many "mistakes") were not as venal as the French, either in Egypt or in the post-1919 Middle Wast, and in fact tried very hard to "do the right thing" (I think it fair to give them the benefit of the doubt) in the mandates and territories they obtained (even as they also tried to benefit from them), their (the British) policies likewise proved futile and they, ultimately, fared no better than the French in the minds of those whose lives they wished to improve and whose societies they wished to catapult into the 20th C.



Prudence and a healthy dose of reality would urge the US do its best not to repeat the mistakes made by previous European powers (and American administrations) that became enmired in ME politics. (Though having said this, it must be pointed out that rarely is anything achieved except by "pushing the envelope" of reality, as it were.)



And it must be remembered that by "conquering" a country, even for that country's own benefit(!), the "conqueror" faces inevitable resentment; ditto for trying to "improve" that country's viability.

This must be especially true in a shame-honor culture that is multiply fractured along deeply mutually suspicious sectarian lines and where paranoia is rife, even as it is encouraged.



Continued....

So while it is clear that the Bush administration, with its allies, is aiming high (as it should), it seems to me that the realistic goals are (in this order):



a) removing Saddam and (thus) the threat he poses to the region, to the wider world (by providing WMD to others) and to his people;

b) ensuring, as far as can be done, that Iraq no longer poses such a threat;

c) enabling a viable and representative Iraqi government to develop and be self-sustaining.



Admittedly, reality is much more complex than such a reduction suggests, as the potential repercussions of any action are vast and not entirely forseeable. But let's assume that point "a" is achievable. And while it is believed that in order to achieve 'b,' 'c' must exist, though 'c' is indeed desirable, the problem is that there it has no historical or cultural precedent, at least in Iraq for 'c' (Lebanon perhaps being the only ME precedent, though its fragility is quite ominous; and Turkey's revolution was performed by a combination of external impetus and internal will).



So it's quite likely that the US will have to settle for a non-democratic (or non-representative) regime that still ensures point 'b.'



This, while doing its best to make sure that the entire country does not descend into anarchy.



The problem is that to achieve all this, the US may have to stay for some time; and this runs counter to the perceived need to, precisely, get out of there as fast as possible.



A delicate balancing act indeed.



On the other hand, if the US, by staying in the region, can provide a sense of internal stability, the perceived need of having to leave quickly may be proven incorrect.

The first thing needed is to establish secular

schools. In the 1830s, a small group of

Tunisian Muslims attempted such a course

but were squelched the the French.



We can speculate whether things might

have been different if at the collision of

civilizations, the European powers had been

willing to impose their mental images,

instead of just law and power, on their

Muslim subjects.



Of course, in places like India, something

like that did happen. The results were not

wholly desirable, but India is not quite

the basket case that western Asia and

north Africa are.