SUPPOSE WE'D EXPELLED HITLER FROM FRANCE BUT LEFT HIM IN POWER:

America's way of war is very different from that of other Western countries. (Neville Meaney, 28/1/03, The Australian)

After September 11 2001, America quite reasonably sought to punish those responsible for the deadly assaults on its citizens, and it mounted an offensive against al-Qaida and the Taliban regime that gave sanctuary to the enemy. This, however, was not an adequate answer. The violation of American innocence, especially since it involved iconic structures, stirred a deep nationalist impulse which could only interpret such an act as the work of demonic forces intent on confounding America's ideals and frustrating its destiny.

Thus the war against al-Qaida became a war against Terrorism. When the war was translated into an "ism" the question of who the enemy was became problematic. One person's terrorist is often another's "freedom fighter". Is the IRA a terrorist organisation? Are the Chechen guerrillas terrorists? For American purposes an "Axis of Evil" comprising hostile states was identified and Iraq, being at that time the most defiant of the unregenerate, was threatened with invasion. And this despite the fact that there was no demonstrable relationship between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein.

This second, potential, Gulf War is not at all like the first. In 1991 the Americans were defending a friendly state from Iraq's military aggression. They acted under the authority of the United Nations. All their European allies as well as the other Arab States in the Middle East gave their support. Not least of all, there was a proper Western interest at stake, namely to prevent the vast oil reserves of the region from coming under Saddam Hussein's control.

Profiting from their Vietnam mistakes, the triumphant Americans, in accordance with the wishes of the UN and their Arab allies, after expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait stopped at the border and forced Saddam Hussein to accede to conditions which still protect the Shi'ites and the Kurds from the worst excesses of his brutal rule.

What the present President is proposing is to fight a war that lacks all the ingredients that made his father's war, from almost every aspect, a good war. That is, it would be a war not against aggression but of aggression. It would be a war aimed at invading another country and overthrowing its government as well as destroying its putative weapons of mass destruction. If the UN will not bow to America's demands, it will act unilaterally.

Let's assume he's not really confused about whether the IRA and the Chechens are terrorists and instead ask: If the first Gulf War was a "good war" then why is Saddam Hussein still in power?

SPEAKING OF FAILING TO WIN A WAR:
Desert Caution: Once 'Stormin' Norman,' Gen. Schwarzkopf Is Skeptical About U.S. Action in Iraq (Thomas E. Ricks, January 28, 2003, Washington Post)

Norman Schwarzkopf wants to give peace a chance.

The general who commanded U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War says he hasn't seen enough evidence to convince him that his old comrades Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Paul Wolfowitz are correct in moving toward a new war now. He thinks U.N. inspections are still the proper course to follow. He's worried about the cockiness of the U.S. war plan, and even more by the potential human and financial costs of occupying Iraq.

And don't get him started on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. [...]

Just as the Gulf War looks less conclusive in retrospect, so has Schwarzkopf's reputation diminished since the glory days just after the war, when, Rick Atkinson wrote in "Crusade," Schwarzkopf "seemed ubiquitous, appearing at the Kentucky Derby, at the Indianapolis 500, on Capitol Hill, in parades, on bubblegum cards."

Twelve years and two American presidents later, Saddam Hussein is still in power, and the U.S. military is once again mustering to strike Iraq.

Some strategic thinkers, both inside the military and in academia, see Schwarzkopf's past actions as part of the problem. These experts argue that if the 1991 war had been terminated more thoughtfully, the U.S. military wouldn't have to go back again to finish the job.

"Everyone was so busy celebrating the end of the Vietnam syndrome that we forgot how winners win a war," says one Gulf War veteran who asked that his name not be used because he hopes to work in the administration.

Schwarzkopf in particular draws fire for approving a cease-fire that permitted the Iraqi military to fly helicopters after the war. Soon afterward, Iraqi helicopter gunships were used to put down revolts against Hussein in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north of Iraq. Only later were "no-fly zones" established to help protect those minority populations.

This one's too easy: just recycle the Scowcroft comments from a few months ago

Posted by Orrin Judd at February 3, 2003 1:23 PM