Why indeed. I found the reasons given by David Pryce-Jones in his "The Closed Circle" to be, most unfortunately, very convincing.

Which are?

First, I'd say the dominoes haven't exactly fallen altogether in Latin America. Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina are rather wobbly right now, and if you look closely at other places like Bolivia and Paraguay, their democracy isn't much better than what you have in Egypt or Iran.



The other problem with applying the Dominoe Theory to Iraq is that the dominoes in E. Europe happened, not because of outside intervention, but because (1) Soviet withdrawal and (2) popular discontent with the system. Invading Iraq will create an opposite dynamic where the Muslim world will accept their oppressed lot as a necessary one to fend off the military incursions of the infidel.



Again, I point to Iran. U.S. influence there has been nil for the past two decades, and our popularity is high while the government has become wobbly. Time and distance are our allies here, not force and haste.



Finally, keep in mind that we're dealing with gov't here. They can't even educate our own kids about democracy, why should we think they'll do any better with a bunch of hostile foreigners?

There can be 2 (or maybe more) answers about why Muslims are democratic.



The common or garden variety answer is, look at 'em, the most advanced thinkers of the most powerful civilization in the world (according to them) for the past 1,400 years, and did they install democracy on their own?



The analytical answer is bound to be complex. But the more I know about Islam, the more I am impressed by how tenacious it is. True, it does not deliver the goods, but that does not seem to be a disincentive to adherents.



Buddhism disappeared from India, Christianity disappeared from western Asia. I cannot think of any significant area where Islam retreated without a forcible

removal of populations.



I have to say I cannot see it at all, but the warm sense of personal and social security that Muslims speak of so fervently must be real.



Anyhow, they obviously don't need no stinking democracy, prosperity or individual freedom. If they wanted it, they could have had it long ago. They seem to actively dislike them.

Just because The End of History hasn't arrived yet doesn't mean it isn't in the process of Ending. Within a hundred years, the whole world will be free and democratic.

The important point being missed is that the standards of acceptable behavior in Latin America have been raised. Last year was the first time in years where a Latin American army tried to intervene in it's countries politics. Chavez was back within 48 hours.



Not only are the rightist/nationalist elements restrained, but as Chavez and Lula in Brazil have found out, leftists are similiarly being constrained.



The countries down there have a long way to go, but to expect instant compliance to standards that took places like the US and Western Europe several centuries to achieve (1789 -- Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one example) is the worst form of pessimism. They are laready showing that they have learned from the mistakes of others, and are trying (and not always succeeding) to not repeat them. Therefor I expect they will achieve the higher standards a lot faster than we in the US did.

In a nutshell, Pryce-Jones' thesis is that the Arabs have a deeply entrenched tribal shame/honor culture and he is pessimistic that they will be able to break out of their death spiral. He's firmly in the Clash of Civilizations camp.

Jed:



But suppose Morroco, Jordan, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. turn into some semblance of functional democracies and begin to be integrated into the West, as is already happening with Turkey--wouldn't that tend to break the cycle?

These cultural arguments don't wash with me.



Democracy has flourished in a number of countries you wouldn't have expected it to, like Taiwan for instance.



And don't equate Arabs=Muslims as Muslims=Arabs.



As for why Arabs haven't progressed to democracy I suppose the one of the answers is hatred of Israel, the US and thereby an unwillingness to adopt the political machinery of the West. This of course contributed to Nasser's rather stupid brand of Arab national socialism and associated parties like Baath.



Others are the populace being bribed by oil wealth to keep things theway they are and US willingness for "stability" in the region which means don't lean too much on the despots so the oil keeps flowing.



I'm not sure if change will come, unless a permanent settlement with Israel is reached and the oil runs out.

Although "The Closed Circle" is a most depressing analysis of a seemingly intractable set of cultural phenomena, I would reject "tarring" the book as a subset or offshoot of the "Clash of Civilizations" camp, this because the characteristics (pathologies?) that the book portrays underscore, chiefly, the reasons for intra-Arab rivalry, contempt, hatred, conflict, and warfare. And ultimate societal breakdown (which provided the impetus for Western colonialism in the first place).



Of course, these---how could it be any different?---are the same characteristics that inform the Arab/Moslem conflict with the West.

And with India. And, if you will (but many probably would not), with Israel.



As for rejecting the Arab/Moslem nexus, what is one to make of the socio-political realities within Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh (Malaysia, perhaps, being an exception; and Brunei being in a class of its own, I suppose, even both share certain features with the others)?



Fierce (or not so fierce) cultural relativists might indeed take issue with this, of course.

Morocco and Jordan offer real hope because the reforms are internal. I'd also add Iran to the list. Our hold on Afghanistan is currently limited to the confines of Kabul and other urban areas, and I don't have much hope of anything permanent starting there because whatever we impose will be seen as just that: a foreign imposition. The same goes for Iraq.

I don't necessarily endorse Pryce-Jones' views. There are good arguments on both the End of History side and on the Clash of Civilizations side. I'm an agnostic and an empiricist on this--I think an experiment is going to be run in Iraq and we're going to see some results one way or the other. Human nature is the same everywhere, but cultural habits can be awfully hard to break. Also, I don't mean to tar the book negatively. I categorize it in the Clash of Civilizations camp because it is so deeply pessimistic. In fact, it's a hellish read.

As I understand it, the problem inherent with the shame/pride cycle is precisely that to acknowledge that one needs help at all is shameful; and especially if such help is required of, and provided by, an external element (especially a Western power).



This creates a situation that when you need help, you can't ask for it; when you do ask for it, you hate yourself for doing so; when the help is profferred, you hate the one providing the assistance, since it underscores your own weakness and inability to solve your own problems.



The only solution is to deny that you needed the help and to look for ways to denigrate the one who helped you, at worst; or deny any contact with that party, at best.



We're not even talking gratitude here (whatever that might be in the political sphere).



So it's back to a situation of denial, lying, and unreality.



And if Pryce-Jones's thesis is correct, shame/pride is just one aspect of the problem.



By the way, an interesting book in this regard is "Shame," one of Salman Rushdie's earlier novels.

Ali, so why isn't democracy (or some tailored-to-fit form of modernism) breaking out in the parts of the Koran Belt (Arab and non-Arab alike) that don't have oil or Jews to bash?



If I had to pick a Moslem country that I thought had a political future --- and I don't think there are any -- it would not be Orrin's favorite Turkey but maybe Morocco.