January 19, 2003
REUNIFICATION NOW:
The Crisis Last Time (William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, January 19, 2003, NY Times)Fifty years ago the Korean War ended not with a treaty but with a truce. Just how precarious that truce can be is being demonstrated on the Korean Peninsula--much as it was demonstrated in June 1994, when the United States came to the brink of war with North Korea.That crisis is forever ingrained in our memories because we were personally involved in preparations for a possible military strike on North Korea's nuclear reactor complex at Yongbyon with conventional weapons, and for the war that could well have followed--a war that would have been disastrous for all sides. Today's crisis is eerily similar to that of 1994. But what happened four years later may be just as pertinent as the Bush administration thinks through its options now. [...]
In the end, we recommended that the United States, South Korea and Japan all proceed to talk to North Korea--but with a coordinated message and negotiating strategy.
The other night on CNN, Ken Adelman debated Clifford May about a more radical option: Mr. Adelman says that we should just announce, or leak the news, that we're withdrawing our troops, because S. Korea doesn't want them there anymore:
Long-term dependency yields dysfunctional relationships and warped perspectives. The incoming South Korean president dishonestly poses as an "honest broker" between us - their saviors and current protectors - and North Korea - their invaders.But why this notion of beginning to withdraw American troops from Korea? Especially from a hawk, like me?
Because beyond Korea, it would send a timely message on Iraq, and transform the East Asia region. It could break today's dysfunctional paradigm of a still-dependent but increasingly-resentful South Korea, a duplicitous China, a free-riding Japan, and a you-handle-the-messy-stuff Russia.
One would think we might even go a step further and add that we're reviewing whether the Korean Penninsula is a strategic interest of the United States and whether it might not be more appropriate for S. Korea, Japan, Russia and China to handle the North Koreans. The worst that might happen is that North Korea would attack and take over the South, but they'd be stretched so thin they'd fall apart rather quickly (just as the USSR would have been unable to maintain control over Western Europe had we withdrawn after WWII). On the other hand, as Mr. Adelman suggests, it might teach our allies a salutary lesson about who their enemies truly are.1 Posted by Orrin Judd at January 19, 2003 6:50 PM
Well, I think China is egging N. Korea on with
the idea of getting the US to withdraw from
S. Korea in disgust so it can take over Taiwan.
And some people are falling for it.
I think that would be biting off your nose to spite your face. Anyway pulling out of SK now would be seen as Somalia Redux, a retreat in the face of belligerence.
Although why the US still has troops in Germany is beyond me.
Anyway I can't see the rationale behind the USSR not being able to keep control over Western Europe after WW2. Most of the populations of those countries were in no shape to resist communist takeover and the resources of the area could well have enabled the USSR to prolong its' unlamented life.
We really need to tell our ROK allies that if they don't want us there we are fully ready to give them the old RVN shaft--no troops, no air power, just "F*** Y**, we'll let some of you hang on to the helo skids on the roof of the embassy if you're lucky."
Posted by: Lou Gots. at January 19, 2003 8:49 PMIt might be argued that the reason there are so many American troops in East Asia and Northern Europe is because these are places where war would be so unthinkable in the nuclear age that the U.S. has assumed the imperial burden, so to speak, of maintaining peace where war would simply be too damaging.
Admittedly, the rationale before International Communism fell was more clear.
Mightn't a thermonuclear exchange in East Asia be just what we need at this point to re-establish the deterrent effects of our having nuclear weapons? We might need to see both the damage they can cause and that their use is not unthinkable in order for folks to take them seriously again.
Posted by: oj at January 20, 2003 8:28 AMAdd to Orrin and Cella's argument that we have other uses for 2ID plus the air assets and you now have not only a reason to redeploy but also a time table.
Posted by: Tom Roberts at January 20, 2003 12:57 PMI take them seriously right now.
I think Ali is right about the Red Army in 1945. There
were plenty -- though not a majority -- of collaborators
ready to go in France, Italy etc.
The USSR would not have made a success of it, but there have been plenty of unsuccessful but long-lasting
tyrannies.
Good grief! What a price to pay for a return to seriousness! I'll take resentment from S. Korea and belligerence from China.
Posted by: Paul Cella at January 20, 2003 4:02 PM