DiIulio seems to think that Bush's "compassionate conservatism" is simply liberalism, and therefore centrist Democrats are its natural supporters while fundamentalists and libertarians are its enemies. DiIulio's failure stems from his inability to recognize that the exact meaning of "compassionate conservatism" is to be worked out through a negotiation process that unites fundamentalists, libertarians, and centrists around some compromise legislation.

It's actually always seemed to me to be first a rhetorical device, not ceding the "high ground" to the Left, and seconndly a commitment to bring conservative principles to bear on non-traditional issues, like Welfare.

Yes -- it's not a policy but an intuition, that there exists a policy set that can unite conservative Christians, libertarians, and centrists (i.e. Democrats or moderates who want policies that work and don't care whether they enhance federal power or not -- unlike the left who oppose anything that strips the federal govt of power -- e.g. Mickey Kaus, who supported welfare reform because he knew it would help the poor). But the exact policy set has to be discovered. DiIulio's job was to discover it.



So it is a rhetorical device, but it works because it expresses a vision of unity and effectiveness, along with a commitment to centrists to find conservative policies that they can support. It is a keystone of the political effort to build a majority coalition that embraces the chief conservative camps -- Christians and libertarians -- as well as centrists, as Reagan built a coalition with the 'Reagan Democrats.' DiIulio was undermining that strategic goal by rejecting conservatives in favor of leftists who wanted to increase government power over private organizations.

DiIulio's other error was to think that the main job of people in Washington is to debate policy. Wrong: there are a million academics and thinkers in this country, and a hundred Washingtonians with responsible legislative portfolios. If these hundred focused on policy debate, they might advance the state of policy art by an additional .01% over and above the efforts of the million academics; but they will not get anything done. In contrast, if they focus 100% on marketing their pre-developed policy plans and building a coalition, then they can advance the state of practice. DiIulio didn't value this marketing effort (e.g. he sneers at "reducing every issue to its simplest, black-and-white terms for public consumption") and he didn't value the coalition-building process either, if the coalition had to include the evangelicals and libertarians he thinks of as far-right (thus his disdain for those who tried to counter his efforts to build a coalition on the left by "steering legislative initiatives or policy proposals as far right as possible.") In short, he was opposed to all practical efforts consistent with Republican political strategy.



This is why I question the wisdom of giving important positions to Democrats. Their own political loyalties will encourage them to sabotage Republican efforts to build coalitions with moderates. They prefer to get moderates to build relationships with leftists, as that will help the Democrats.

pj:



On the other hand, a host of GOP stalwarts, from Bill Bennett to Jeane Kirkpatrick to Richard Perle, were Democrats whose experience in the Reagan Administration led them to join the GOP.

Yes, my statement was overbroad. I think national security positions are fine for competent, patriotic Democrats. Homeland Security, Defense, even State (if you can find a competent diplomat among the Democrats -- does one exist?) would be fine. But DiIulio's job put him at the heart of the domestic culture war. He's a Democrat because he is loyal to one side of that war. It's too much to expect him to fight against his own side.