September 4, 2002
WHO WAS THAT MASKED MAN? :
Notes On Neoconservatism (Kevin Holtsberry, September 03, 2002)Orrin unduly focuses on neocons support of Israel when in fact their anti-communism was the locus point of their connection with conservatism during the Cold War. In fact, Norman Podhoretz anti-communism was so staunch that it undermined his credibility during the Reagan years and contributed to Commentary's decline. The reason there was a neo attached is because the left was taken over by the "New Left" which increasingly became anti-American and isolationist. The neocons rejected this turn and eventually this pulled them into the conservative orbit. This is the foundation of neoconservatism (see the useful The Rise of Neoconservatism by John Ehrman.)Outside of their anti-communism the single most significant idea that described neocons was "unintended consequences." If you had to find a phrase that captures the neocon persuasion it is this phrase. Neoconservatism was not - as Orrin correctly notes - born out of opposition to the New Deal but rather to Johnson's Great Society. This may not be in line with old guard Republicans and traditionalist conservatism but it certainly was in opposition to the liberalism of the day. That is what pushed the neocons in to the conservative camp on domestic issues. James Q. Wilson captures this well:
If there is any article of faith common to almost every adherent [of neoconservatism], it is the Law of Unintended Consequences. Things never work out quite as you hope; in particular, government programs often do not achieve their objectives or do achieve them but high or unexpected costs. A true conservative may oppose change because it upsets the accumulated wisdom of tradition or the legacy of history; a neoconservative questions change because, though present circumstances are bad and something ought to be done, it is necessary to that something cautiously, experimentally, and with a minimum of bureaucratic authority. Neoconservatives, accordingly, place a lot of stock in applied social sciences research, especially the sort that evaluates old programs and tests new ones.
This then is the heart of the neocons approach to domestic policy. Change is difficult and likely to backfire so go carefully and use the best tools possible. The twist is that the neocons do this while generally supporting bourgeois culture. Again, Wilson:
. . . they [neocons] have great sympathy for and often take their cue from the general and settled convictions of the average American. Not all these convictions, mind, but at least those that arise out of the better side of human nature. In particular: Americans love America and think it very much worth defending; so do neoconservatives. Americans (and people generally) think that families are vital, mediating institutions important, and public order desirable; so do neoconservatives. And perhaps most important of all, neoconservatives embrace the American conviction that many of the central problems of our society arise out of a want of good character and human virtue.
It is this belief in virtue and American exceptionalism combined with a strong support for bourgeois values that influences neoconservative's domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic arena it led and leads to reform in areas like welfare, race relations, and education. In foreign policy it leads to a tendency towards exporting democracy and an emphasis on human rights (albeit a more conservative version).
Where I think Judd is most off base, however, is when he accuses neocons of utopian belief in the ability of government to solve societies problems. This is simply inaccurate. Neocons certainly are not as fiercely anti-government as many paleos but to describe them as utopian is unfair in the extreme. Neocons have always approached policy, foreign and domestic, with a deep realism (largely connected with the writing of Reinhold Niebuhr). Just because William Kristol and David Brooks seem to go of the deep end does not mean you can throw out the entire history of the term. People like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elliot Abrams, and Irving Kristol are not wild-eyed utopians and neither are many of their intellectual inheritors.
At long last the neocons have found a defender, can an example of liberal humor be far behind?
Posted by Orrin Judd at September 4, 2002 8:39 PM