TRUE INDEPENDENCE:

[M]ilitary defense is just the tip of the iceberg. The Finnish comprehensive security concept also encompasses the economy, infrastructure, security of supply, civil defense, and overall societal resilience. Everything in Finnish society is thought through from a security perspective. Every building above a certain size--including all apartment buildings and public facilities--are required to have civil shelters. In the capital city of Helsinki, a system of tunnels can provide shelter for up to 900,000 people, which is more than Helsinki's population. The construction blueprints of all strategically located bridges include a mechanism to attach explosives onto the bridge to disrupt the forward movement of an enemy in case of an attack. Finland also maintains emergency reserves of critical supplies. These include grain to last at least six months, medicine to last three to 10 months, and fuel for five months. The reserves have been expanded since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The population is also recommended to have personal emergency reserves to last at least 72 hours.

Finnish comprehensive security is based on two main principles: preparedness and foresight. Preparedness measures include contingency planning, continuity management, advance preparations, training, and preparedness exercises to enable proaction instead of reaction. Foresight consists of monitoring changes and trends in the operational environment and reviewing possible scenarios, as well as assessing prior experience with crisis situations. Since 1961, the Finnish Defence Forces have been offering defense courses for people holding significant positions in multiple sectors such as business, politics, administration, civil society, and other relevant fields on both the local and national levels. The participants build an essential network of central security actors in times of crisis. Apart from these more high-level courses with selected participants that take place four times per year, national defense courses are also offered to ordinary citizens--specifically to women, who are exempt from conscription. The courses' popularity has surged since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Preparedness Pays Off

This foresight and focus on self-sufficiency has effectively neutralized Russia's threats. On May 14, Russia cut off electricity exports to Finland with only one day's notice. Finland used to import around 10 percent of its electricity from Russia, but Fingrid--Finland's electricity grid operator--began to limit its import volume from Russia in April in anticipation of potential disruptions. Finland has also invested in wind energy, and a new nuclear power plant has been in test use since March 2022 and will become fully operational in the winter. It is estimated that Finland will be electrically self-sufficient by 2023 and will likely be a net electricity exporter.

One week later, on May 21, Russia also stopped natural gas deliveries to Finland after Helsinki refused to consent to Moscow's rouble payment scheme. The impact remained limited. While some industries--such as the forest-based and chemical industries as well as bakeries--use gas for production, they had already started looking for alternative sources in summer 2021 when the Russian gas company Gazprom did not fill its reservoirs reliably. In 2020, Finland imported 67 percent of its natural gas from Russia, but gas made up only 6 percent of Finland's total energy use. In addition to three already existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, in May the Finnish company Gasgrid Finland Oy and U.S.-based Excelerate Energy Inc. signed a 10-year lease agreement for an LNG terminal ship, which secured Finland's security of supply in the coming winter.

Finland also moved fast to diversify its oil supply following the invasion of Ukraine. In 2020, 86 percent of Finland's oil imports came from Russia, which accounted for 21 percent of the country's total energy  usage. However, the Finnish company Neste reported that it had replaced 85 percent of Russian imports through the end of April with other non-Russian oil, such as North Sea oil, but will continue receiving crude oil from Russia in its refinery until July 2022. Neste had already been reducing imports of Russian oil gradually in 2021. Coal will also soon be phased out entirely, and Finland has enough of its own capacity to replace Russian wood imports. The downside is that this will inevitably lead to higher prices for Finns. But the consensus has so far remained strong in Finnish society that no price is too high when it comes to energy independence from Russia and solidarity with Ukraine. 

Finland has always prioritized energy self-sufficiency and kept a diverse energy source portfolio to avoid dependencies. The security policy implications of Russian energy have constantly been a factor in Finland's risk calculations. A government decision in 2014 to approve a contract between the Finnish Fennovoima and the Russian Rosatom for a new nuclear power plant was thus highly disputed and the Green Party even left the government over the issue. Fennovoima terminated the contract in May 2022, after it had been left pending final government approval since 2015.

Before Russia's attack on Ukraine, Finland had an export volume to Russia somewhat above the EU average at around 5 percent. But by April, the volume had already decreased by 70 percent. This decrease was largely due to voluntary withdrawals by Finnish companies from the Russian market starting in the first weeks of the invasion--even before Western sanctions came into effect. The pressure of public opinion to stop doing business with Russia has been very strong. And in early April, Prime Minister Sanna Marin encouraged Finnish companies to terminate any remaining business activities in the Russian market. Whatever little leverage Russia may have had over Finland, it is gone for good.

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