AND IT WAS WEAK THEN:

Let's start with the basics. The U.S. system of tort liability rests on the notion that entities should be forced to internalize the costs of their activities rather than imposing them on others. If your widget plant can pollute the river and not pay for the pollution, you'll overproduce widgets because others are cleaning up your mess. You'll also make a lot more pollution because you have no incentive to do anything else.

Thus an enterprise able to escape liability for the social costs of its operations is likely to take fewer precautions. That's true not just for the polluting factory but for any business. If employees who contract the novel coronavirus on the job can't sue their employers, the employers will have a reduced incentive to invest in safety precautions. The result will be more infections, and a greater social cost. That, in a nutshell, is the case against a liability shield for businesses, and tends to explain why legal scholars have tended to oppose such protections. 1

But there's more than a nutshell here. It's true that in general, U.S. law hasn't favored broad liability protections, even when the nation was entirely mobilized for war production during the 1940s. Nevertheless, even though we know liability shields increase reckless behavior, they surround us.

Consider qualified immunity, the controversial doctrine that protects government officials from most lawsuits for violating constitutional rights. That's a liability shield, and opponents (myself included) argue that its net effect is to increase reckless behavior.

Or consider the doctrine's scarier and tougher big brother, sovereign immunity, the near-total liability shield for the government itself. Few are proposing that we do away with it. Yet sovereign immunity also encourages the government agencies it protects to take fewer precautions than private businesses would -- as for instance when the Environmental Protection Agency, freed from concerns about cleanup costs, accidentally polluted the Animas River in Colorado in 2015.

Government also creates liability shields through legislation, as in the partial protection afforded under the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act, enacted in 2002, to encourage companies to create innovative anti-terrorism technologies. More recently, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, adopted earlier this year, largely shields pharmaceutical companies that produce Covid-19 vaccines from lawsuits for harm the vaccines may cause. (This protection, in a variety of forms, actually stretches back to 1986. The federal insurance fund that took the place of tort claims has paid out some $4.4 billion.) Some observers have suggested that U.S. firms might be reluctant to ship their new vaccines abroad unless similar liability protection is provided.

What all these grants of immunity have in common is the belief that the institutions they protect would not operate optimally in their absence -- that is, that the benefits of the protections outweigh their costs. If this is ever true, it's likely to be so only in the short run. For example, the argument for a shield against terrorism-related lawsuits was stronger in, say, the fall of 2001 than it would be today. Similarly, the argument for shielding businesses from Covid-related liability claims was stronger last spring than it is now.

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