THE GREAT DEFUNDING:

It's not hard to see the link between paramilitary police training and the abuses motivating the past several weeks' protests. When police recruits are belittled by their instructors and ordered to refrain from responses other than "Yes, Sir!," they may learn stoicism--but they may also learn that mocking and bellowing orders at those with less power are acceptable actions. When recruits are ordered to do push-ups to the point of exhaustion because their boots weren't properly polished, they may learn the value of attention to detail--but they may also conclude that the infliction of pain is an appropriate response to even the most trivial infractions.

Many police recruits enter the academy as idealists, but this kind of training turns them into cynics, even before their first day on patrol. And although most police officers will go through their entire careers without ever firing their weapons, others will inevitably get the wrong lessons from their paramilitary training, and end up like the fired Minneapolis officer Derek Chauvin.

D.C.'s police academy has changed a lot in the short time since I graduated, and even in 2016, it was relatively relaxed compared with the rigid spit-and-polish atmosphere that prevails in many other training programs. The majority of law-enforcement academies in the United States are loosely modeled on military boot camps. Proponents of this approach argue that cops are a lot like soldiers: They have to follow orders regardless of their personal feelings; they have to run toward gunfire, not away from it; and they have to remain cool and professional in the face of chaos, threats, and harassment. In this view, paramilitary training takes undisciplined young recruits and turns them into lean, mean fighting machines, ready to handle the rigors of street patrol.

In most police departments, paramilitary traditions extend well beyond the academy. Senior police officials commonly refer to patrol officers as "troops," chain of command is rigidly enforced, and it's undeniably true that many departments have made enthusiastic use of federal authorities such as the Defense Department's 1033 Program, which provides surplus military equipment--including armored vehicles and grenade launchers--to domestic law-enforcement agencies. (Since its inception, the program has transferred more than $7 billion worth of military equipment to more than 8,000 U.S. law-enforcement agencies; ironically, small-town and rural agencies, rather than large city departments, have been most likely to request heavy equipment such as mine-resistant vehicles.)

The paramilitary aspects of police culture are so deeply entrenched that most officers and police chiefs take them for granted, rarely questioning the need for boot polishing, drill and formations, and rigorous mandatory workouts as a central part of police training. But the paramilitary model is as pernicious as it is ubiquitous, and any meaningful approach to police transformation needs to confront it head-on.

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