WHAT THE WoT's ABOUT:

Even though IS-K's early presence was marked by cooperation with local jihadists, its aim was to eventually replace the Taliban and monopolise power. These chapters provide a month-to-month reconstruction of events, surveying all regions within Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. The author compares and contrasts IS-K with the Taliban in terms of organisational structure and ideological/sectarian motivations, while chapter five highlights the drivers of support for the Islamic State in Khorasan. Giustozzi reiterates that although IS-K's insistence on anti-Iranian and anti-Shia rhetoric did not seem to resonate with the local population, for many former Taliban, "it did not really matter which organization they belonged to; they vaguely wanted to fight for what they could perceive as a 'just cause'".

In general, IS-K was more attractive due to its more efficient organisational structure and discipline in military rank, where tribal-affiliations played a lesser role than in the Taliban and positions were allocated more on merit than connections or status. Moreover, IS-K provided better equipment, as well as higher and more regular salaries, ranging between 400 and 800 USD per month for local fighters, and between 1,500 and 2,000 USD for jihadists sent to Iraq. Moreover, the families of martyrs received a one-off 15,000 USD payment. In comparison, the Taliban paid their militants only 100 USD per month. IS-K could offer better salaries because, in 2015, its funding per capita was approximately 10 times larger than that of the Taliban. Their leadership appeared to enjoy some degree of independence from IS-Central even though they maintained strong connections to Iraq and Syria, notably because Arab trainers were sent to Khorasan to train local militants. The organisation had no trouble with recruitment and "every month 1,000-2,000 aspiring volunteers were knocking at its doors". In this sense, IS-K could afford to be selective.

Chapters six and seven detail IS-K's expansion, as well as its source of funding, with the support of maps and graphics. The author includes meticulous information on the local jihadist factions that pledged allegiance to IS-K, including non-Afghan and non-Pakistani groups such as Iranian Baluchis, Central Asians as well as Chinese. IS-K received most of its funding from the Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan, highlighting how regional rivalries came into play as many Arab donors, both state and private, sent funds to IS-K as part of a proxy war with Iran. Overall, for 2016, external funding for IS-K was estimated at 238 million USD.

The final two chapters offer some reflections on the consequences of IS-K's establishment for the Afghan jihadist landscape. Ordinary Afghans saw IS-K as a more oppressive force than the Taliban as, in Giustozzi's words, they "perceived the Taliban's imposition of Shari'a as much more tolerable than IS-K's version of it". Interestingly, people also seemed to oppose the group's Salafi inclination, which they regard as contrary to true Islam. In this respect, the book could have better detailed the religious subtleties behind its analysis of local resistance and cooperation.

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