DUNGBOTS:

Measuring the overall success of what the Communists called their "general offensive-general uprising" strategy is a subject of endless debate. But as for the anticipated rebellion - the South Vietnamese every-person instinctively throwing off the shackles of U.S. neocolonialism - Dang and his compatriots were clearly very wrong.

The southern populace didn't rise up, but still, it was quite a fight. When the Tet Offensive launched on January 30, more than 100 cities across South Vietnam - including Saigon - and military outposts came under attack. The worst of the fighting was in Hue, where 150 Marines died and around 5,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed, mainly in airstrikes.

During the brief occupation of the ancient capital, the Communists proved how nasty they could be.

The bodies of more than 2,800 people were discovered, and another 3,000 residents of Hue were missing. They also set about razing Hue's treasured heritage; palaces, temples, and monuments from the distant past were leveled.

But the counteroffensives were as vicious as they were successful. As the attacks subsided, the U.S. intensified its Phoenix Program, designed by the CIA to neutralize the infrastructure of the Viet Cong and its political wing, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, through "infiltration, capture, counterterrorism, interrogation, and assassination."

It proved highly successful, neutralizing 81,740 suspected Viet Cong operatives, informants, and supporters. Of them, somewhere between 26,000 and 41,000 were killed between 1965 and 1972, many after Tet.

The initial Tet attacks were followed by two other waves, in May and August, and because of this Communist forces stayed entrenched close to the cities during the interlude between these rolling campaigns.

This tactic, driven by decisionmaking in Hanoi, proved lethal for Viet Cong survivors because it allowed South Vietnamese and U.S. troops to leapfrog over Communist positions and attack their main forces that were dug in from the rear.

The Communist ranks were devastated, especially the southern fighters. 1969 and 1970 were dark years, during which resentment of Hanoi burbled among southern leaders who felt they had been cannon fodder for Hanoi's quixotic plans.

But public opinion in the United States of what the Tet Offensive meant reflected a different perspective of a complicated reality: the yawning gap between what their own leaders were saying about an enemy on the ropes and the waves of Communist attacks that rippled across South Vietnam, and across their TV screens. Far from impending defeat, there seemed to be a Communist soldier under every rock.

That's where An, who had a college education and interned with U.S.-based newspapers a decade earlier, stepped in. He sought to reinforce an American public in its mistaken belief that the Viet Cong remained a strong, viable force capable of defeating the mighty U.S. military.

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