When Ghul and Zarqawi met in January 2004, Zarqawi bluntly explained that his strategy in Iraq was to incite a sectarian bloodletting. He would assassinate Shiite political and religious leaders until that sectarian war began. Ghul relayed news of that plan to Abd al-Hadi, who, according to summaries of the conversation published by the Senate Intelligence Committee, replied that he was "opposed to any operations in Iraq that would promote bloodshed among Muslims." After Ghul was captured by Kurdish counterterrorism forces in 2004 on his way out of Iraq, he told CIA investigators that Abd al-Hadi "counseled al-Zarqawi against undertaking such operations."

Abd al-Hadi's concerns were twofold. He objected to Zarqawi's brutal and divisive strategic vision, but because of distance and communication failures did not have a clear picture of events in Iraq. It was hard to truly assess, let alone criticize, Zarqawi's approach.

Fortunately for Abd al-Hadi, there were many al Qaeda members eager to travel to Iraq to fight. The al Qaeda leader hoped that if he could embed trusted operatives on the ground, he would have a better picture of the operational environment and therefore more leverage over Zarqawi. So Abd al-Hadi ordered Ghul to broach this issue with Zarqawi, and develop a route for fighters to make the journey to Iraq. Zarqawi had a deep independent streak, so this was a sensitive subject, but he was open to the idea and even requested individuals with specific technical skills.

Perhaps inspired by Zarqawi's willingness to collaborate, Abd al-Hadi proposed something more radical: He would personally come to Iraq. But Zarqawi's interest in new recruits did not extend to al Qaeda leaders more senior than he, even if they were actually Iraqi. Perhaps worried about an implicit challenge to his leadership, Zarqawi rebuffed the suggestion, explaining to Ghul, per the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, that "this was not a good idea, as operations in Iraq were far different than those Abd al-Hadi was conducting in Afghanistan."

For the time being, Abd al-Hadi did not push the issue.

Zarqawi finally swore allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004, but on his own terms. He was bending the knee, Zarqawi explained, only because his "respected brothers in al Qaeda understood [his] strategy ... and their hearts opened to our approach." Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was born, but the strategy of brutality and sectarianism that Abd al-Hadi warned against would continue.

Al Qaeda's effort to control Zarqawi continued as well. In a July 2005 letter, al Qaeda's then second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, warned him not to alienate Iraqis and to "avoid scenes of slaughter."

Zarqawi was unimpressed. After U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte released a copy of the letter in September 2005, Zarqawi's spokesman called it a fraud, arguing that it had "no foundation except in the imagination of the politicians of the Black House and their slaves."

The disconnect between al Qaeda and Zarqawi became a crisis in November 2005, when Zarqawi's foot soldiers bombed three hotels in Amman, Jordan, killing more than 60 Jordanians. Al Qaeda's leadership was furious. "Policy must be dominant over militarism," wrote Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, an al Qaeda commander in Iran, to Zarqawi three days after the Amman bombing. He ordered Zarqawi to halt all operations outside Iraq.

Atiyah reiterated Abd al-Hadi's concern about al Qaeda's ability to manage events in Iraq from afar, and was alarmed that Zarqawi apparently thought Zawahiri's July letter was fraudulent. The document was authentic, he wrote, and represented "the thoughts of the brothers, the sheikhs, and all of the intellectual and moral leadership here." He argued that improving coordination between al Qaeda and AQI was the group's highest priority. "Preparing [the brothers] to be messengers between you and the leadership here," Atiyah explained, "is more important than ... sending the brothers for some operations like ... the hotels in Amman."

Zarqawi finally fell in line, partially. In January 2006, he established a coalition of Iraqi jihadi groups, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), which was designed to assuage some of al Qaeda's concerns. The group named an Iraqi as emir, and Zarqawi reduced his public profile.

But the MSC was still mostly window dressing. Most importantly, it did not include the second-largest jihadi group in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah, which has Kurdish roots and a mistrustful relationship with Zarqawi. Al Qaeda's central leadership was eager to unify the jihadi movement -- but Zarqawi distrusted Ansar al-Sunnah, so they engaged Ansar al-Sunnah's leadership directly.

On Jan. 26, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to Ansar al-Sunnah on behalf of al Qaeda's Special Committee for Iraqi Affairs that the committee favored unification between AQI and Ansar al-Sunnah. More strikingly, it acknowledged that such a step was possible only "after reforming the situation of AQI." Three days later, the committee sent another note urging that "all the obstacles standing in the way [of unification] must be removed."

One of those obstacles may have been Zarqawi himself.