July 4, 2013
THEY'RE AN ISLAMIST PEOPLE AND THE BROTHERHOOD IS THE ISLAMIST PARTY:
This is Not the End of Islamism in Egypt: Beyond the Pro- and Anti-Islamist Divide (Elizabeth Nugent, 7/04/13, NY Times)
Some media accounts of recent events have categorized them as the result of conflict between two sides, an Islamist government pitted against a "mostly secular opposition" that "opposed the Islamist agenda of Mr. Morsi and his allies in the Muslim Brotherhood." These descriptions may be applicable to the leading opposition parties within the National Salvation Front coalition, but it is not an accurate portrayal of the opinion of the majority of those reportedly 17.5 million individuals who participated in this weekend's protests or the Egyptian people more largely. This false dichotomy suggests that these protests and tensions center on issues related to religion and state, and implies a certain misunderstanding of Egyptian political attitudes.It would be a mistake to read the mobilization against the president and in support of the military as simply anti-Islamist, as a political ideology. These protests and mobilization have been anti-Muslim Brotherhood, as a political entity - albeit an Islamist one - whose political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, has failed its constituents. The Tamarud campaign which first initiated this week's mobilization focused solely on the political failures of Morsi in terms of substantive domestic and foreign policy issues, outlined in the petition circulated and signed by over 22 million Egyptians, without referencing any issue pertaining to the relationship between religion and state. One, then, would be hard pressed to describe current events in Egypt as a referendum on Islamism - unless one incorrectly equates Islamism, in Egypt or more generally, exclusively with the Muslim Brotherhood. While the FJP's governing days may be over, it is too soon to declare the end of Islamism.Islamism can be defined as support for the introduction of Islamic tenets into political life through the implementation of sharia. This admittedly vague definition allows us to classify both parties (those with political platforms promoting sharia) and individuals (those who agree with the concept of implementing sharia) as Islamist.Recent survey data suggests that the vast majority of Egyptians are Islamists, as they continue to support in high numbers the implementation of sharia and its introduction into their country's laws. In April 2013, Pew released a report titled "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society", which included a nationally representative sample of 1,798 Egyptians. The data was collected in November and December 2011, and hardly paints a picture of a stark secular-religious divide, or wide scale support for secularism in the definition commonly used. Rather, Egyptians overwhelmingly support the integration of religion and politics.
Only one leading party supports that integration, so they'll win the next election too.
Coups and Democracy (Nikolay Marinov & Hein Goemans, 6/07/13, Forthcoming BJPolS)
We use new data on coup d'états and elections to document a striking development: whereas the vast majority of successful coups before 1991 installed durable rules, the majority of coups after that
have been followed by competitive elections. We argue that after the Cold War international pressure inﬂuenced the consequences of coups. In the post-Cold War era those countries that are most dependent on Western aid have been the ﬁrst to embrace competitive elections after the coup. Our theory also sheds light on the pronounced decline in the number of coups since 1991. While the coup d'état has been and still is the single most important factor leading to the downfall of democratic government, our ﬁndings indicate that the new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors.
Posted by Orrin Judd at July 4, 2013 7:13 AM