THAT'S REALLY YOUR BEST CASE SCENARIO?:

Can Baghdad Learn from Rome?: Italy’s postwar history is an encouraging example for a country that hears little good news. (Jay Hallen, May 16, 2011, National Review)

Iraq today has many of the same conditions that troubled Italy in 1946. Saddam’s Baath party had a socialist economic ideology, with a centrally planned economy relying heavily on the oil sector. Nearly all major sectors have been, and continue to be, in state hands. While the private sector has made key inroads, particularly in the banking industry, a 2008 New York Times survey suggests that the Iraqi government directly or indirectly employs some 2.4 million people, or over 35 percent of the country’s workforce. Security work creates the most jobs, with the Defense and Interior Ministries the two leading employers in Iraq. As in postwar Italy, Iraq’s ministries are largely controlled along political and sectarian lines, with even the lowest-level employees needing to prove their loyalties. There are numerous factions among the primary ethnic and religious groups, and the resentment among the groups is unquestionably deeper-rooted and more complex than in postwar Italy. The January 2011 return to Iraq of firebrand Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr only further complicates matters. However, the best path toward reconciliation and healing still starts with the same model of government largesse along party lines. Fortunately, a culture of corruption and favoritism has never been lacking in Iraq.

The absorption of excess labor, particularly former fighters and insurgents of every stripe, into already-bloated government ministries, security forces, and other state-sponsored employment is absolutely critical. Salaries and benefits must be higher than anything al-Qaeda and its affiliates can offer. For Iraq, pacifying the restive Sunni minority, which had governed the country under Saddam but suffered retribution after his fall, is the highest priority. One of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s greatest challenges will be to open more ministry posts for marginalized Sunnis, who have greater experience in managing the state’s bureaucracy. Allowing the Kurds an appropriate level of autonomy, to head off their threats to secede, is also crucial. In September 2010 the Iraqi government unveiled a plan to integrate some 52,000 Sunni members of the pro-U.S. “Awakening Council” militias into an array of federal, provincial, and local government jobs. Maliki is trying to sell the plan to the Shiite-controlled Interior Ministry, which is currently pushing back. His success in implementing this plan could be his crowning achievement as a politician, and would go a long way toward helping stabilize the country. Skilled diplomacy is preferable to a constitutional mandate that would divide key government posts along sect lines, as in Lebanon. Lebanon’s model has kept an uneasy peace in that country, but it is an inflexible system that is nearly impossible to amend. Such mandates are not a long-term solution for a democracy.

The distribution of Iraqi oil revenue along political lines can provide a medium-term stability that will encourage foreign and domestic investors to start taking risks. Like Italy, Iraq is sure to experience its own economic miracle once the country is secure, and it is private-sector growth, not a system of patronage, that will guarantee Iraq’s long-term future. Iraq is awash with energy and agricultural resources, and it has a strong culture of entrepreneurship. Investors have been waiting since 2003 to participate in the country’s recovery, while oil prices edge upward amidst a healing global economy. War recovery is big business, as shown by the decades of high growth in Europe immediately following World War II. While Italy and the rest of Europe had the Marshall Plan to assist their growth, Iraq receives and will continue to receive comparable American aid and investment. As the economy grows, the 325 members of Iraq’s Council of Representatives, who hail from four major and five minor political parties, will have more resources at their disposal to direct to supporters in the form of jobs, contracts, subsidies, and more.

Iraq also suffers from a lack of national unity, which, in the most optimistic of circumstances, the dispensation of jobs and favors could help amend. Sunnis’ current grumblings are rooted in a perceived lack of fairness in the distribution of largesse. By tipping the scales slightly more in their favor, the government might help to relieve tensions. Then, as in Italy, once the economy starts growing, and the state refills the power vacuum, and improved security permits cultural institutions like national TV and sporting leagues to flourish, the Iraqi state can reoccupy the common imagination. In my own experience in Iraq in 2003–04, I was encouraged by the near-unanimous acknowledgment by the people I talked with that they were Iraqis first, and whatever sect or ethnicity second. Despite American concerns about Iranian meddling, Iraqi Shiites have historically distrusted their Persian neighbors, and have no interest in living under Tehran’s influence. Memories of the Iran-Iraq War loom large. Iraqi security forces, with the help of retired militiamen, must beat back the remaining extremists who would sow hatred and violence rather than see a multiethnic Iraq flourish — obviously no small task. As the American armed forces continue their gradual withdrawal through 2011, Iraqis will have one less source of tension in their midst, and will be forced to confront a new reality in which they have no choice but to work together with their brothers. Will a fragile Iraqi state unified by economy and culture be able to beat back future acts of terrorism, as the Italians did around 1980? It is hard to say, but with the right governance and some short-term fixes, the economy could grow strong enough that it becomes preferable to any sectarian alternative.

In this best-case scenario, Iraq can follow Italy’s path from a poor, divided, war-ravaged country with a state-run economy to a modern nation with a middle-class populace that takes to the streets over jobs and growth, and not the politics of identity. Today’s Iraq actually leads 1946 Italy in educational attainment, with 9 percent of Iraq’s adults having graduated from secondary school, compared to 5 percent for 1946 Italy. Conversely, 1946 Italy benefitted from the relative stability of its neighbors and the economic integration that would lead to the European Union. But Italy’s road has not been easy either. The country has suffered consistent political upheaval, with no fewer than 62 governments in the 66 years since World War II. The lesson this teaches is profound: Once an economy is allowed to grow, through a peace forged by whatever regrettable or corrupt means necessary, a society can gradually develop a common identity and grow strong enough to withstand social and political shocks. This should be encouraging to Iraq, a place that hears little good news.

The lesson that should be learned is that if you cut to the chase and break up into your constituent nations in the first place then you don't have to pay off each group to stay in the artificial state.

Posted by oj at May 16, 2011 5:57 AM
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