DEVOLUTION INTO MORE NATURAL STATES IS A BEST CASE SCENARIO, NOT A WORST:

Where we are in 2010: Collapsing Arab states may well be a pattern in the future if the key fault lines between and within these states are not boldly addressed (Amr Hamzawi, 1/13/10, Al-Ahram Weekly)

The term "failed state" seems appropriate to the four previous cases, whether the state is verging on collapse or is in the grips of an existential legitimacy crisis. But there are two additional levels of the crisis of the nation state. While they are more prevalent in the Arab world, they are more difficult to capture in buzzwords and snappy phrases. In the Gulf (apart from Kuwait), Syria and Libya we find a dangerous dichotomy between societies whose economic, social and administrative structures have undergone rapid modernisation and the regimes that govern these societies on the basis of pre-state autocratic political arrangements that have constantly demonstrated their failure to respond to the needs and horizons of societal evolution. For example, while political plurality and the division of powers is non-existent in the Gulf, where civil and individual liberties are heavily restricted within the framework of authoritarian rule uninterrupted since the creation or independence of these states, market-oriented economic structures -- and the complex administrative systems similar to those in the capitalist West -- present an image of a modern society that cannot be reduced to the tribe, sect or other primary allegiances. A similar situation exists in Syria and Libya, even if the autocratic state has donned a republican façade and blazoned progressive slogans. In spite of considerable success Gulf countries, Syria and Libya have had in sustaining the stability of their governments, relying on the calculated distribution of rentier incomes, and/or on the repressive capacities of their security agencies, the perpetuation of the dichotomy between an advanced society and traditional state is certain to court tensions between the state and more active segments of society seeking greater civil and individual liberties and an institutionalised democratic order.

At the next level there is popular dissatisfaction with the policies and politicians of the state in societies such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. Yet in these countries, the modernisation of the state, at least superficially, has proceeded more or less in tandem with the modernisation of society, and the legitimacy of that state is not subject to widespread question. These societies differ in terms of their political arrangements, the components of the ruling elite, the abilities of their governments to provide essential economic and social services, the trajectory of the gap between the rich and poor (which is shrinking in the case of Tunisia whose middle class has developed rapidly over the past three decades, while it is expanding in Morocco and Egypt in both of which the poverty rate is pushing beyond 20 per cent). Nevertheless, these societies share a growing level of popular discontent directed at government agencies and officials, and widespread despair at the prospect of a better future, in spite of the relative stability of the state. The most salient sign of popular dissatisfaction has been the sporadic but increasingly frequent protests generally sparked by poor public services, wage and working condition demands, and other economic and daily life concerns. Another indication, although not as clear cut, is reluctance to participate in official political processes by actively boycotting elections and by refusing to join political parties over which hangs considerable scepticism with regards to their ability to systematically and effectively advocate for and meet the needs and aspirations of the people.

The crisis of the nation state, in the four degrees of intensity described above, weighs heavily on the Arab world. At best it hampers the ability of the state to perform its primary functions and it obstructs the prospects of sustained development and democratic transformation. At worst, it lends itself to forces propelling towards the disintegration of the state and the fragmentation of society.

Had the Middle East been allowed to evolve into natural nations after WWI it would have avoided these pathologies. But Wilson traded their sovereignty for his League.

Posted by Orrin Judd at February 15, 2010 6:27 PM