SHHHHH, YOU'LL HARSH THE UR'S MELLOW...:

Pakistan's Partial War on Terror: The deadly results of cooperation with terrorists (C. Christine Fair, 10/16/09, The Wall Street Journal)

For decades Islamabad has viewed and used terrorist groups as assets to be cultivated. Before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan used Islamist militants for operations in India and Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan aids the Afghan Taliban mainly in the belief that if U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan wanes, it would be better to be friendly with a group like the Taliban that can keep Indian influence in the country at bay—the same logic behind Pakistan's pre-2001 support for the Taliban.

At home, Pakistan has tolerated a raft of terrorist groups ostensibly linked to Kashmir, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for last year's Mumbai massacre, continues to operate under various names. Its leadership roams free and its offices remain open. Jaish-e-Mohammad, responsible for several attacks in India and against international and domestic targets within Pakistan, is similarly unconstrained. Pakistan's track record against so-called anti-Shi'a militias, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, has been equally lackluster despite vicious attacks against Shi'a who are perhaps one-fourth of Pakistan's population. These varied groups are ensconced not in the unruly tribal areas, but in Pakistan's most populous and militarized province: the Punjab. Punjab hosts six army corps, yet these groups proliferate and operate with impunity literally under the nose of Pakistan's army.

Islamabad has long believed it could exploit these groups for strategic aims while preventing them from causing too much "unapproved" trouble. The government would have likely come to some modus vivendi with the Pakistan Taliban, had its leaders agreed to focus upon Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. Islamabad cracked down militarily on the Pakistani Taliban earlier this year only after it was clear that deal-making had failed. With respect to the so-called Kashmiri groups, Pakistan only sought to moderate their activities to prevent serious Indo-Pakistan crises and international pressure while maintaining their basic operational readiness.

Now it's possible to see exactly how shortsighted and dangerous Pakistan's strategy has been.

But the Nobel laureate assures us that if you give the Taliban what they want they'll co-operate....

Posted by Orrin Judd at October 16, 2009 2:33 PM