THE DOMESTICATION CONTINUES APACE:

Skeptical Moroccans look hopefully to Islamists (Zakia Abdennebi, 8/31/07, Reuters)

Many members of the secular-minded elite that has ruled Morocco since independence hail from Fez, but the former imperial city has seen a surge in support for the [the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD)] in the decade since the party was formed.

The PJD became the third biggest party and the main opposition in the Rabat parliament in 2002 and has built political capital by rounding on corruption and calling for more morality in public life.

It has also voiced strong support for the monarchy and condemned religious extremism.

Several PJD politicians hail from the same political class that has ruled the country for half a century and its policies seem to differ little in substance from those of its rivals.

But many ordinary Moroccans are hoping its religious grounding means that, if elected, PJD officials would strive harder against corruption than their predecessors.

"I will put my faith in this party and if it disappoints the people once again, may it assume its responsibility before God," said Abdulkrim, a 32-year-old clothing and perfume seller.

"All the political parties have plundered Morocco's riches," says Kenza Niyari, 52, a housewife wearing a headscarf and loose djellaba robe.

"I have no confidence in any party but if there's one that commits to enforcing true Islam, it'll get my vote because we have failed to follow Islam properly and ended up backward."

The PJD has said it would need to show quick results to avoid alienating its supporters, but says ambitious promises would be pointless before it knows how powerful a government under its command will be.

Morocco's electoral system discourages large majorities by political parties, forcing political groups to form coalitions after the elections. Even if a party wins the majority a lot still hangs on negotiations with the palace, where the king holds the ultimate veto.

MORE:
Transformation of Turkey (SOLI OZEL, 8/31/07, Japan Times)

The president obviously represents the state and is more than a mere figurehead. He sits in Ataturk's chair. He has wide-ranging powers, including the authority to make senior government appointments. He appoints judges to high courts and members to the Higher Educational Council (YOK). He selects the presidents of state universities from a list submitted by the YOK. In times of peace, he is the commander in chief of the armed forces.

This is why the crisis over the presidential election was actually a crisis of the constitutional order installed by the military when it ruled from 1980-1983. That constitution — unlike Ataturk's — was written by and for the military on the assumption that the Cold War would never end, and that the president would always be either a military person or someone close to the military.

But the Cold War is long over, and a lot has since changed in Turkey. An International Monetary Fund-supported program in 2001 unleashed rapid economic growth, based on Turkey's gradual but definitive transformation into a market economy. At the same time, Turkey moved decisively onto the path of political and administrative reform to start EU accession negotiations.

Moreover, Turkey's economic and social transformation brought forth a new elite. The AKP came to represent this new elite and its quest for political power.

Many foreign commentators described the presidential and parliamentary elections as a contest between Turkey's secular past and a putative Islamist future. However, the contest is more accurately seen as one between an open and an introverted Turkey; between civilian, democratic rule and military tutelage; and between a globalizing and a protectionist economy. The AKP's support came from both the winners and losers of globalization, from conservative middle Anatolia and cosmopolitan Istanbul, from the nationalist Black Sea region and the predominantly Kurdish Southeast.

The FP Memo: Brothers In Arms: The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood have more in common than they think. But if the Brotherhood is to win over American skeptics, its actions will have to match its words. (Marc Lynch, September/October 2007, Foreign Policy)

TO: Mohammed Mahdi Akef
Supreme Guide
Muslim Brotherhood
FROM: Marc Lynch
RE: How to Talk to America

When you took over the reins as head of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2004, promising to put freedom at the top of your agenda, you probably couldn’t have imagined where your organization would be today. Although still technically banned, the Brotherhood has emerged as the leading opposition group in Egypt, with 88 seats in parliament. Your calls for governmental transparency and accountability represent an entirely new battle in Egyptian politics—and you’ve got the scars to prove it.

Since contesting parliamentary elections, you’ve seen the Egyptian regime aggressively tamper with the ballot box, launch a massive campaign of arrests of Brotherhood members, and alter the Constitution to prevent your participation in the political process. Many in the West are concerned about the way you’ve been treated by the Egyptian government. But your continued ambiguity about the Brotherhood’s core political commitments, your ambivalence toward Hamas’s attacks on Israel, and questions about your connections with Islamic extremism have left even your backers doubting your true intentions.

You recently complained that the United States “only knows the language of violence and blood and destruction and doesn’t even offer dialogue as an option.” But today you have a historic opportunity for such a dialogue. Americans now recognize they are losing the war of ideas in the Arab world, that Islamic extremism is on the rise, and that the promotion of democracy in the region has collapsed. A vigorous debate has ensued in Washington about the Muslim Brotherhood. Some now see you as a relatively moderate force and a potential partner in a common struggle for democracy and against Islamic extremism. But many others see you as an enemy to be confronted, your Islamist agenda as a major source of extremism and anti-Americanism, and your talk of democracy as a deception meant to fool gullible Westerners. How you engage with this debate will have long-lasting repercussions for your relationship with a United States that isn’t leaving the region anytime soon.

If you are sincere about seeking meaningful dialogue with the West, then you must tackle this debate now, while it’s hot. But repeating the same tired slogans isn’t going to cut it. Demonstrate that, despite many policy differences, you share two fundamental goals with the United States: democracy in Arab countries and curtailing the influence of al Qaeda. If you truly want to persuade Americans—and other Arabs and Muslims—of the value of engaging with you, here’s how to do it:

Posted by Orrin Judd at August 31, 2007 6:18 PM