WHAT ABOUT THE YELLOWCAKE

Powell's battle cry fails test of time: Six months after his case swung opinion toward attacking Iraq, his intelligence file looks thin. (Charles J. Hanley, Aug. 10, 2003, Associated Press)

How does Powell's Feb. 5 indictment look today? He has said several times since then that he stands by it, the State Department said last week. Here is an Associated Press review of major elements, based both on what was known in February and what has been learned since:

-Satellite photos: Powell presented satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers and trucks, and suggested they showed Iraqis moving prohibited missiles and weapons to hide them. At two sites, he said trucks were "decontamination vehicles" associated with chemical weapons.

These and other sites had undergone 500 recent inspections. Chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix had said a day earlier that his experts found no contraband and no sign that items had been moved. Nothing has been reported found since. [...]

-Scuds, new missiles: Powell said "intelligence sources" indicated Iraq had a secret force of up to a few dozen prohibited Scud-type missiles. He said it also had a program to build 600-mile-range missiles, and had roofed a test facility to block the view of spy satellites.

No Scud-type missiles have been reported found. In the 1990s, U.N. inspectors had reported accounting for all but two. No program for long-range missiles has been uncovered. Powell did not note that U.N. teams were repeatedly inspecting missile facilities, including looking under that roof, and reporting no violations.

This detailed analysis of the case that Colin Powell presented to the UN is absolutely devastating, provided, of course, that you're willing to accept a few assumptions:

(1) That Saddam Hussein would have given up his pursuit of a domestic WMD program so long as UN inspectors remained in the country.

(2) That he would have let them remain--recall that they were only allowed to return under the threat of our imminent attack.

(3) That the rest of the world was willing to maintain the inspections regime and sanctions--unlikely given that Russia and France both wanted to get back to business with Iraq.

(4) That Saddam would not just have bought WMD, nukes or lesser, from N. Korea, which is desperate for hard cash, which he had in abundance.

(5) That all of these are risks worth taking where the security of allies in the region are concerned, never mind our own security.

In the end, your view of the justness and necessity of the war is likely to depend more on whether you're willing to make such assumptions than on anything Mr. Powell said. Posted by Orrin Judd at August 10, 2003 9:36 AM