THE ROAD AHEAD

The hard road that Abbas will have to travel (Ahmad Samhi Khalidi, May 1 2003, Financial Times)

Within hours of the swearing-in this week of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Palestinian Authority prime minister, the US and its diplomatic partners presented him and Ariel Sharon, his Israeli counterpart, with their long-awaited "road map" for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [...]

Concurrently, it requires a reassessment of Palestinian strategy (particularly the use of violence), while maintaining Palestinian national unity as a supreme goal.

Mr Abbas's success in meeting these challenges will depend on four critical factors. The first is his ability to maintain a working relationship with Yassir Arafat, the PA president. Even in normal circumstances, the unprecedented attempt at power-sharing would have been problematic. It is bound to be even more so when both the US and Israel are seeking to eliminate Mr Arafat as an effective political force. Nonetheless, Mr Abbas is likely to seek to maintain his own authority by complementing Mr Arafat, rather than trying to supplant him. He is well aware of Mr Arafat's standing as the national symbol of the Palestinians (and the only democratically elected leader in the Arab world).

The second factor is the Palestinian opposition. Mr Abbas has shown he will accept political diversity but not "multiple centres of authority". Despite being a devout Muslim, he is staunchly nationalist in his political outlook and is instinctively hostile to the Islamists' radical activism. But he will be wary of being seen as an Israeli proxy, brought in to satisfy Israel's security concerns at the expense of the Palestinians'. His temperament and record suggest he will give priority to dialogue rather than armed confrontation with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the other opposition groups. Whether they respond favourably will depend largely on whether they can be induced to join the Palestinian political process and on whether Israel will desist from undermining Mr Abbas by pursuing Hamas regardless.

Third, the new cabinet will have to prove itself effective. The Palestinian public has high expectations of a rapid change in both their politics and their daily life, starting with an end to Israeli military assaults and colonisation and encompassing the restoration of freedom of movement and law and order and the establishment of new standards of governance. At the same time, Mr Abbas will have to adopt a tougher and more effective stance in peace negotiations. His call to demilitarise the intifada has increased the pressure on him to show that the non-military path is a viable alternative.

Last, there is the need to meet the concerns of outside parties. Israel, with backing from the US and the European Union, will continue to demand an exceptional effort from the Palestinian security forces. But Mr Abbas's room for manoeuvre will be severely restricted unless Israel shows unprecedented self-restraint and a parallel willingness to provide the Palestinian public with a viable political horizon (well beyond Mr Sharon's terms for a final settlement).

There is little in the recent past to suggest that any of this is more than a remote possibility.

That'll be easy enough, eh? Posted by Orrin Judd at May 2, 2003 3:50 PM