THE ENGAGEMENT WENT WELL; NOW LET'S GET MARRIED

Church as Civics 101: The robust civic engagement of Protestant clergy (John Schmalzbauer, May/June 2003, Books & Culture)

Have Americans withdrawn from civic life? Have we become a "nation of couch potatoes," choosing HBO over the PTA, MTV over the YMCA? Political scientist Robert Putnam thinks so. Putnam argues that Americans have become increasingly disengaged from voluntary associations since the 1960s, spending more time in front of the television and less time with their fellow citizens. While surveys show that Americans devote less time to clubs and groups and belong to fewer of them, organizations such as the Red Cross, the PTA, labor unions, and fraternal organizations report steady declines in membership. Even worse, fewer Americans belong to bowling leagues, preferring to "bowl alone."

The publication of Putnam's article, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," along with a subsequent book, has led to a vigorous debate about the level of civic participation in America. Citing rival surveys, some scholars argue that participation in voluntary associations has actually increased.

Others argue that Putnam has focused on the wrong sorts of groups. To be sure, they concede, membership in bowling leagues and fraternal organizations has declined, but what about soccer leagues and Habitat for Humanity?

And what about churches? Religious congregations remain the most widespread form of voluntary associations in American society. Has participation in American congregations also declined? In Bowling Alone, Putnam estimates that "attendance and involvement in religious activities has fallen by roughly 25 to 50 percent" since the 1950s and 1960s.  Despite a temporary post-9/11 surge in religiosity, church attendance is back where it was before the attacks on Washington and New York.

But do attendance figures tell the whole story? In Congregation and Community, sociologist Nancy Ammerman argues that Putnam seriously underestimates the civic vitality of America's 300,000 congregations. Her own study found that many churches serve as civic places, "hosting community gatherings and political debates."

Providing even more evidence of the civic role of religious congregations, a growing body of research in the field of political science suggests that churches "function quite effectively as political communities." As political scientists Michael Welch, David Leege, Kenneth Wald, and Lyman Kellstedt point out in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, "overt political messages and subtext are often interwoven in the conversations among parishioners, the context of church bulletins, and other symbols (e.g., artwork and posters) of a congregation's collective stance on sociopolitical issues." In their estimation, the "most important role in this process of political communication is played by the clergy."

Indeed, for much of the 20th century, mainline Protestant clergy encouraged their congregations to get involved in public issues, preaching the "Social Gospel" and crusading for social change. In Martin Marty's terminology, mainliners stood for a "Public Protestantism," focusing on "the social order and the social destinies of men," while evangelicals embraced a "Private Protestantism" that emphasized "individual salvation out of the world" and a "personal moral life."

Much has changed since the 1960s. While mainline Protestant clergy are still known for their political and social engagement, they preside over a much smaller flock. Today much of the religious activism in American politics takes place in evangelical churches. Walk into many evangelical churches and you are likely to see copies of Focus on the Family magazine
and Christian Coalition literature. Stroll through the parking lot and you are apt to encounter bumper stickers proclaiming "Abortion Stops a Beating Heart" and other prolife slogans. If it's a presidential election year, the SUVs and minivans may also feature endorsements of the Republican ticket. It would seem that evangelical clergy and congregations have become as politically engaged as their mainline counterparts.

According to The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy, that is exactly what has happened. The most extensive survey of clergy politics since the 1960s, the book?published five years ago, but losing none of its relevance in the interim?is an indispensable guide to the political attitudes and activities of both evangelical and mainline Protestant pastors. Coauthored by James Guth, John Green, Corwin Smidt, Lyman Kellstedt, and Margaret Poloma, it is based on surveys of over 5,000 clergy in four evangelical denominations (Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist Convention, Evangelical Covenant Church, Christian Reformed Church) and four mainline denominations (Reformed Church in America, United Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church-USA, Disciples of Christ).

Using a battery of theological questions (on biblical inerrancy, the virgin birth, Jesus and salvation), the authors divide their sample into "orthodox" and "modernist" clergy. One of the most striking findings of the book is that orthodox clergy are increasingly likely to report a high level of interest and involvement in politics. For example, 79 percent of the "most orthodox" and 83 percent of the "most modernist" pastors reported a "high level of interest in politics." Likewise, 95 percent of the "most modernist" and 92 percent of the "most orthodox" said they had taken a public stand on a political issue.

The political transformation of evangelical clergy from private to public Protestants can be seen most dramatically among Southern Baptist respondents. Between 1980 and 1992 the percentage of the "most orthodox" Southern Baptist pastors approving of protest marches "rose from 19 percent to 52 percent; of action groups, from 42 percent to 55 percent; and of joining national political organizations, from 31 percent to 42 percent."

While modernists were more likely to have formed a political study group in their church, contributed money to a political candidate and joined a national political organization, there were much smaller differences between modernist and orthodox approval of pastoral "cue-giving activities." In fact, the surveys show that orthodox clergy were more likely than their modernist counterparts to approve of pastors taking a public stand on a "moral issue," and more likely to say that they have endorsed a candidate from the pulit or publicly prayed for a candidate. The very denominations that have grown the most since the 1960s (the Southern Baptist Convention and the Assemblies of God) have also experienced a surge in clergy activism.

It is not too much to say that the resurgence of the Republican Party nationally coincided with the re-engagement of the Religious Right in politics.  What was cause and what effect is harder to trace, but this much is certain: if the GOP does not keep the loyalty of the religious, it can't win. Posted by Orrin Judd at May 18, 2003 7:55 AM