ISLAM'S CHRISTIAN, A KEY TO DEMOCRACY OR THE BAR?

The Shiite 'menace' (Charles Krauthammer, 5/02/03, Jewish World Review)

Of course there are telegenic elements among the Shiites who would like fundamentalist rule by the clerics. But even the majority of Iranians oppose the rule of the mullahs and consider the Islamic revolution a disaster. The Shiite demonstrators in Iraqi streets represent a highly organized minority, many of whom are affiliated with, infiltrated by and financed by Tehran, the headquarters for 20 years of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

These Iranian-oriented Shiite extremists are analogous to the Soviet-oriented communists in immediate post-World War II Italy and France. They too had a foreign patron. They too had foreign sources of money, agents and influence. They too had a coherent ideology. And they too were highly organized even before the end of the war. They too made a bid for power. And failed.

There is no reason to believe that Iranian-inspired Shiite fundamentalists will be any more successful in Iraq. Iraqi society is highly fractured along lines of ethnicity, religion, tribe, region and class. It is in the interest of all of them, most particularly the Kurdish and Sunni minorities, who together make up about 40 percent of the country, to ensure that no one group wields absolute, dictatorial power over the rest. And as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld correctly pointed out, America is there to make sure that doesn't happen. One man, one vote, one time is not democracy.

Moreover, Shiism is not a hierarchical religion like Roman Catholicism. It is extremely decentralized. Among the Shiite majority itself are myriad ideological and political factions. Islamic scholar Hillel Fradkin points out that Khomeiniism -- the seizure of political power by clerics -- is contrary to centuries of Shiite tradition and thus alien and anathema to many Iraqi Shiites.

Does this mean that Jeffersonian democracy is guaranteed in Baghdad? Of course not. But the United States is in a position to bring about a unique and potentially revolutionary development in the Arab world: a genuinely pluralistic, open and free society.

The administration erred, however, by going initially for an occupation "light." It did so understandably at first, victory having come so swiftly and crushingly that there were no existing institutions such as police or army to fill the vacuum, and simply not enough American soldiers for adequate seizure of full power.

But there also appeared to be a conscious decision to play down the occupation, lest we stoke Iraqi nationalism and resistance. This was a mistake, rooted, as are most Middle East mistakes, in the inextinguishable myth of the "Arab street." The critics always predict that the "street" will rise at any show of American power. It invariably rises at any show of American weakness or indecision; it becomes quiescent at the showing of American power.

Our problem in postwar Iraq has been a paucity of force, rather than an excess. The way to succeed is with an occupation "heavy." The administration is hurriedly sending in about 4,000 more soldiers, heavy with MPs, and not a moment too soon. Occupation light has permitted the ad hoc seizure of power in pockets of the country by various ambitious nasties. America needs to fill the vacuum, so it can then devolve power on those committed to a truly democratic outcome.

How to Mix Politics With Religion: If America holds its ground until democratic institutions take hold, the odds are decent that Iraqi Shiites will support democratic government. (REUEL MARC GERECHT, 4/29/03, NY Times)

[T]he rank-and-file of the Iraqi clergy may well be in a time warp. To their east is Iran, which Iraqi clerics see as more moral than what they knew under the Westernized Saddam Hussein. But these clerics do not know their Iranian counterparts nearly as well as they once did. It is quite possible that the average Iraqi cleric, deprived of information under a totalitarian system, is not fully aware of the Iranian people's increasing distaste for Iran's experiment with "Islamic democracy."

With the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, however, Iraqis and Iranians will be able to observe each other more closely. In particular, Iranian and Iraqi clerics will quickly resume their student exchange programs, which had been going on for centuries. Iran's best clerical students will certainly return to the holy city of Najaf in Iraq, the most prestigious center of learning in Shiism. Given the significant dissident clerical movement within Iran, it is not unlikely that Iran's ruling hard-core mullahs--and Mr. Sadr, Mr. Hakim and other revolutionary Iraqi clerics--will lose influence when Iraqi clerics learn more about Iran's "Islamic Revolution."

Yet it will be difficult for Iraq's senior Shiite clergy to embrace publicly America as a midwife to democracy. For clerics who have been proud guardians of the country's Islamic patrimony and independence from foreign rule, it would be embarrassing to support America. Mr. Sadr, Mr. Hakim and their allies in Tehran understand this all too well--which is in part why they have engaged the religious establishment so forcefully so soon. [...]

The internecine battle between Iraq's Shiites isn't an impossible task for the United States to handle. Americans should realize that neighborhoods run by clerics aren't necessarily bad. In difficult times, the Shiite clergy has always tried to protect its flock. United States officials can resist the radical factions while also being careful not to run roughshod over the duties and prerogatives of the traditional clergy. Washington must be willing, however, to exercise decisive force to curtail those who seek to sabotage the foundations of liberal democracy. If the Iranians are financing their preferred Iraqi clerics, then we must do so as well.

Above all, America must hold its ground until democratic institutions take hold. If it is patient, the odds are decent that Iraqi Shiites will support
democratic government. If they do so, they may bury forever, in both Iraq and Iran, the spirit of Ayatollah Khomeini.

What's the Difference Between Shi'ah and Sunni?: With a history of persecution and belief in martyrdom, the Shi'ite Muslim majority in Iraq may be more receptive to Christianity. (Todd Hertz, Christianity Today)

[T]here are theological and historical points on which Shi'ites can better relate to Christians.

A veteran in Muslim evangelism who asked not to be named told CT that Shi'ites have been more likely to accept Christianity. "Historically in the heartland of Islam?the Middle East and North Africa?Iran has been by far the most responsive country to the gospel," the source said. "Most people believe that is because of the Shi'ite belief system."

Woodberry says there are interesting parallels between Shi'ah and Christianity. "What we have been seeing this month take place in Iraq is a commemoration in Karbala to recognize the death of Muhammad's grandson Hussein," Woodberry says. "His death to Shi'ites has a similar function to the way Christians look at Jesus."

In the Muharram commemoration of Hussein's death, Shi'ites perform the Ta-Ziya, or passion play, that has Hussein speaking lines such as, "I offer myself as a sacrifice for the sins of my people that they will be saved from the wrath to come." Hussein is called redeemer and intercessor.

"The Shi'ah say Hussein gave his life for them," says George Braswell, professor of missions and world religions at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary. "From the Christian perspective, you can draw a redemptive analogy here. They cry, mourn, and pray that Imam Hussein will hasten the return of the 12th imam to bring them peace, justice, and righteousness." [...]

Several sources said another point of understanding between Shi'ites and Christians is that both come from a history of persecution. "Christianity is a religion that for its first three centuries was persecuted," an anonymous source said. "The New Testament was written in the context of being a persecuted group of people. Sunnis are the opposite. For them, Islam was an empire and most of the Qu'ran's material came from when Muhammad was ruling a state."

Shi'ites can relate to Christians. Not only has their history of persecution translated into their theology, Oksnevad says, but they have also shared suffering with Christians. "Historically, it has been the Christians who have aided the Shi'ites," Oksnevad said. "As one Pakistani told me, they are more favorably looking to the West than the Sunni because they suffered with them. The Shi'ah remember that."

One question in all of this, which lingers after reading Roy Mottahedeh's fine book Mantle of the Prophets, is whether the Shi'a theology of oppression has not become such a central part of the religion that they view every ruler as a de facto oppressor. The very ease with which massive crowds of demonstrators can be turned out after prayers every Friday leaves one wondering if any government will be truly stable. At any rate, it seems pointless to focus too heavily on Islam's politics until the Reformation is enacted, a reformation that does seems like it will succeed more easily among the Shi'a than the Sunni.

MORE:
-As Iraqi Clerics Go Home, Talk of Schism With Shiite Hard-Liners in Iran: Many people believe that the return of Shiite clerics to Iraq may pose a serious threat to the rule of the hard-line ayatollahs in Iran. (NAZILA FATHI, April 28, 2003, NY Times) Posted by Orrin Judd at May 4, 2003 5:42 PM