INSIDE THE BOX:

Six Ways Not to Deal with Hamas: How do you stop a foe whose tolerance for pain exceeds your willingness to inflict it? (Chuck Freilich, March 2008, Foreign Policy)

Let us examine each of the alternatives in turn.

Topple Hamas

For the most part, this has been Israel’s policy. The Israeli government has pinned its hopes on its ability to weaken Hamas through economic sanctions, political isolation, and limited military strikes. So far, it has achieved the opposite. Hamas consolidated its hold on Gaza last June, then temporarily succeeded in lifting the economic siege in February, further increasing its popularity.

Some hope that a major Israeli operation designed to oust Hamas would lead to a power vacuum in which the Palestinian Authority can reestablish its rule, possibly with the assistance of an international force. It is highly unlikely, however, that Hamas can be overthrown and the prospects of the feckless, corrupt Authority restoring and maintaining its rule are minimal. More likely, today’s near-chaos would become tomorrow’s total chaos.

Destroy Hamas Militarily

Israel’s military restraint to date has not been for lack of determination, but simply because an effective, military response, at an acceptable price, has yet to be found. For Hamas, economic and military deprivation are not unacceptable punishments, but a means to fan the flames, rally support, and undermine whatever minimal prospects for peace remain. An enemy that welcomes punishment beyond those that Israel will inflict is fundamentally undeterrable. Only a very large military operation may achieve some lasting benefit against it, but even this is unlikely to produce more than a brief respite. And after disengaging from Gaza, the last thing Israel wants to do is reoccupy it. Nor can the possibility that Hezbollah and even Syria will join the fray be discounted.

Talk to Hamas

Negotiations with an organization that explicitly avows Israel’s destruction at every opportunity are anathema to many Israelis. Political and moral questions aside, what could Israel and Hamas actually talk about? Is there anything short of voluntary national suicide that would satisfy Hamas? Other than a temporary ceasefire, now under discussion, all indications point to the contrary.

The United States, Europe, and even most Arab states, moreover, strongly oppose negotiating with Hamas. To do so would prove that terrorism, not diplomacy, is the way to gain Israeli concessions. It would also gravely undermine whatever residual legitimacy Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas still enjoys.

Hamas’s repeated proposal to negotiate a long-term ceasefire may ultimately be worth exploring. But its present conditions are entirely unacceptable. If Hamas had its way, Israel would have to cease all counterterrorist operations not only in Gaza, but the West Bank, as well— the only thing that has kept Abbas in power and the rockets out of Tel Aviv.

Mr. Freilich, predictably, fails to consider the viable alternative: destroy the radical leadership in Damascus as you change the regime there, support Hamas against the PLO so it can consolidate its rule, recognize Palestine so Hamas has to govern it, and then ignore them.

Posted by Orrin Judd at March 31, 2008 9:01 AM