February 8, 2004
GRAND STRATEGY (continued):
A grand strategy of transformation: President George W. Bush's national security strategy could represent the most sweeping shift in U. S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War. But its success depends on the willingness of the rest of the world to welcome U.S. power with open arms. (John Lewis Gaddis, Nov-Dec, 2002, Foreign Policy)
It's an interesting reflection on our democratic age that nations are now expected to publish their grand strategies before pursuing them. This practice would have surprised Metternich, Bismarck, and Lord Salisbury, though not Pericles. Concerned about not revealing too much, most great strategists in the past have preferred to concentrate on implementation, leaving explanation to historians. The first modern departure from this tradition came in 1947 when George F. Kennan revealed the rationale for containment in Foreign Affairs under the inadequately opaque pseudonym "Mr. X," but Kennan regretted the consequences and did not repeat the experiment. Not until the Nixon administration did official statements of national security strategy became routine. Despite his reputation for secrecy, Henry Kissinger's "State of the World" reports were remarkably candid and comprehensive--so much so that they were widely regarded at the time as a clever form of disinformation. They did, though, revive the Periclean precedent that in a democracy even grand strategy is a matter for public discussion.That precedent became law with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which required the president to report regularly to Congress and the American people on national security strategy (NSS). The results since have been disappointing. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations all issued NSS reports, but these tended to be restatements of existing positions, cobbled together by committees, blandly worded, and quickly forgotten. None sparked significant public debate.
George W. Bush's report on "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," released on September 17, 2002, has stirred controversy, though, and surely will continue to do so. For it's not only the first strategy statement of a new administration; it's also the first since the surprise attacks of September 11, 2001. Such attacks are fortunately rare in American history--the only analogies are the British burning of the White House and Capitol in 1814 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941--but they have one thing in common: they prepare the way for new grand strategies by showing that old ones have failed. The Bush NSS, therefore, merits a careful reading as a guide to what's to come. [...]
[B]ush insists...the ultimate goal of U.S. strategy must be to spread democracy everywhere. The United States must finish the job that Woodrow Wilson started. The world, quite literally, must be made safe for democracy, even those parts of it, like the Middle East, that have so far resisted that tendency. Terrorism--and by implication the authoritarianism that breeds it--must become as obsolete as slavery, piracy, or genocide: "behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and that all must oppose.
The Bush NSS, therefore, differs in several ways from its recent predecessors. First, it's proactive. It rejects the Clinton administration's assumption that since the movement toward democracy and market economics had become irreversible in the post--Cold War era, all the United States had to do was "engage" with the rest of the world to "enlarge" those processes. Second, its parts for the most part interconnect. There's a coherence in the Bush strategy that the Clinton national security team--notable for its simultaneous cultivation and humiliation of Russia--never achieved. Third, Bush's analysis of how hegemony works and what causes terrorism is in tune with serious academic thinking, despite the fact that many academics haven't noticed this yet. Fourth, the Bush administration, unlike several of its predecessors, sees no contradiction between power and principles. It is, in this sense, thoroughly Wilsonian. Finally, the new strategy is candid. This administration speaks plainly, at times eloquently, with no attempt to be polite or diplomatic or "nuanced." What you hear and what you read is pretty much what you can expect to get.
Apparently folks have had trouble finding the original Gaddis essay referenced below, so here it is. Posted by Orrin Judd at February 8, 2004 5:19 PM
Terrorism . . . must become as obsolete as slavery, piracy, or genocide.
I suppose that, technically, obsolete doesn't imply rare.
Posted by: David Cohen at February 8, 2004 6:35 PM...while in contrast, the campaign of Democratic front-runner John Kerry has (stupefyingly) sent an e-mail to the Mehr News Agency in Iran telling them, according to the Tehran Times, that "Kerry will try to repair the damage done by the incumbent president if he wins the election."
The text that follows in the story sounds like the Kerry people sent out a generic e-mail meant for foreign consumption, presumably to "Democratic Party-freindly" people and media in places like France or Germany. But to Iran? Jeez, how does Karl Rove dig these opposition candidates up?
Posted by: John at February 8, 2004 9:54 PMJohn Derbyshire goes absolutely ballistic on Bush's inability to articulate this strategy - Derb
Posted by: TCB at February 8, 2004 10:27 PMI have just unearthed a secretly delivered pre-state of the union address in which Bush seems to clearly state our policy.
http://www.ebaumsworld.com/presaddress2.shtml
